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ABSTRACT
To assure safe shutdown of a nuclear power plant, there must always be reliable means of decay
heat removal provided, in last resort, by an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). Currently
the majority of nuclear power plants in the US utilize diesel generator sets as on-site emergency
power generating units. In addition to the loss of off-site power, plants can lose their on-site AC
power, a condition known as Station Blackout, which increases the calculated probability of
reactor core damage significantly. This study evaluates how suitable fuel cell systems are today
for improving back-up power performance on nuclear power plant sites and how suitable they can
be projected to be by year 2030, when Generation IV reactors are planned to be deployed. The
main system under consideration was the Gas Cooled Fast Reactor, due to its gas coolant and
high power density, and therefore the need for an ultra-reliable shutdown cooling system. Fuel
cells were identified as a preferred candidate because of their efficient continuous operability, and
because most nuclear plants already have existing on-site hydrogen supply and storage systems.
This study uses the operational data of 15 phosphoric acid fuel cells installed on U.S. Department
of Defense bases starting in the year 1994 as the basis for assessment of currently proven
technology. Analysis of data shows that the largest contributor to forced outages is the electrical
subsystems and that the fuel cell stack operates with high reliability and availability throughout
its lifetime. Results underline important technical issues affecting the use of fuel cell systems on
nuclear plant sites today and suggest that given the time frame for the deployment of Gen-IV
reactors, improvements in the performance of electrical and support systems together with
advances in hydrogen generation and storage, the potential of highly reliable fuel cell systems
will be realized.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Reliable power has become among the top priorities for businesses in the past
decade and many have made big investments to counteract unscheduled power losses as
quickly as possible. Most health care facilities, supermarkets, restaurants and residences
have back-up power sources in case of a power outage that could result from bad weather
conditions or unexpected grid failures. While the probability of significant damage to
some businesses increases with the duration of loss of power, a one second outage may
be enough to disrupt about 85% of today's business computer systems [11]. Currently in
the United States, there is a $400 million market [12] to rent or sell equipment for back-
up power (also called temporary or stand-by power) and it is growing rapidly. Depending
on the type of application, the most commonly used distributed generation1 technologies
for back-up power are micro-turbines, diesel gen-sets, gas gen-sets, large batteries and
fuel cells.
An application that requires highly reliable back-up power is emergency core
cooling at nuclear power plants. This is a type of application where economics comes
secondary to safety, making the reliability and availability of the power source extremely
important. During a nuclear plant's normal operation or shutdown, there must always be
1 Although the acronym DG is commonly used for Distributed Generation, in this study DG refers to Diesel
Generators, and no acronym for Distributed Generation will be used.
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a means of decay heat removal. For normal operation conditions with grid power this is
provided by the reactor coolant system (RCS), and in the case of a loss of off-site power
event (LOOP) or a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) is used to remove heat from the reactor core. The majority of the power plants in
the US use emergency diesel generator sets in their emergency core cooling systems.
This study investigates how the use of fuel cell power plants in the emergency core
cooling systems improves the reliability and availability of back-up power at nuclear
power plants. For this purpose, the most detailed fuel cell operation data available [2] was
studied. Based on this data, sub-system and component failure probabilities and the
overall fuel cell train reliability values were calculated by fitting a theoretical failure and
repair distribution to the available data and using the computer code SAPHIRE [13], for
different cases and different set of assumptions.
The data covers about 35,000 hours of operation, for a fleet of 15 200 kW
phosphoric acid fuel cell (PAFC) plants that were run continuously between 1997 and
2001. Most of these fuel cells were installed in 1996, reflecting the best technology at
that time, certainly less advanced that what is commercially available in the market
today. This fleet of fuel cells was operated for providing electricity, domestic hot water,
heating and/or cooling for buildings and not as emergency power sources. While
phosphoric acid fuel cells or grid dependent operation history might not provide the most
suitable data for back-up power applications at nuclear plants (for reasons explained in
Chapter 3) the data used is the most detailed set that is available and accessible.
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1.1.1 Fuel Cells as a Distributed Generation Technology
Distributed Generation is generally defined [1] as power generation technologies
that produce less than 10 MW of electrical output which are at or near the load they
serve. The most common of these technologies include small combustion turbine
generators, internal combustion engines, fuel cells and photovoltaic panels (PV). A
summary of distributed generation technologies is given in Table 1.1.
Table 1-1 Comparison of distributed generation technologies [I1
IC Engines Micro turbines PVs Fuel Cells
Dispatchability Yes Yes No Yes
Capacity Range 50kW-5MW 25kW-25MW 1kW-1MW 200kW-2MW
Efficiencya 35% 29-42% 6-19% 40-57%
Capital Cost ($/kW) 200-350 450-1000 6600 3750-5000
O&M cost' ($/kW) 0.01 0.005-0.0065 0.001-0.004 0.0017
NOx (lb/Btu)
Natural Gas 0.3 0.10 -- 0.003-0.02
Oil 3.7 0.17 -- -
Technology Status Commercial Commercial Commercial Commercial
in larger sizes Scale demos
One of the main reasons for selection of fuel cells for this study was their
electrochemical way of continuously producing electricity, as opposed to the traditional
combustion. This eliminates moving parts, reducing failure probabilities of certain
components and thereby increasing overall system availability. The continuous operation
feature eliminates a failure mode associated with diesel gen-sets, "failure to start", since
it guarantees a successful start as the unit would already be running at the time of
demand. This is especially important because most of the MW size fuel cell power plants
a Efficiencies of fossil and renewable distributed generation technologies are not directly comparable. See
chapter 8 of Reference [1] for more information.
b O&M costs do not include fuel. Capital costs have been adjusted based on quotes. See Reference [I] for
more information.
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take a long time to heat up and start producing power. Fuel cell power plants can be run
in arrays, 24/7, at a lower power rating, and even if one or more of the arrays fail, the
back-up power requirement can still be met while undergoing repair.
1.1.2 Generation IV Reactors
"Generation IV" refers to the development and demonstration of one or more
Generation IV nuclear energy systems that offer advantages in the areas of economics,
safety and reliability, sustainability, and could be deployed in the US commercially by
2030 [36]. Currently, there are 6 promising designs that are undergoing research &
development (listed in Table 1.2); none of which are direct descendents of today's light
water reactors,. Many improvements to commercial nuclear reactors have been made
since the last U.S. nuclear power plant was built three decades ago. Besides being safer
and more efficient, advanced fission reactors will help better utilize the world's energy
resources. This is why, even though current Generation II and III nuclear power plants
generate electricity at competitive costs, a group of governments, universities and
industry members from around the world (known as the Generation IV International
Forum (GIF)), are developing advanced, next-generation nuclear energy systems called
Gen-IV Reactors.
GIF is a group of ten countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Republic of South Africa, Switzerland, UK, and U.S.) that jointly
conduct research on advanced reactors that are categorized by their coolant type: water,
gas, liquid metal, and non-classical. In addition, alternative fuel cycle options are being
14
simulated for worldwide scenarios to allow a better understanding of proliferation
concerns as well as fuel availability.
In order to successfully address the issues confronting current nuclear systems,
the GIF has defined 8 technology goals which must be achieved for nuclear energy to be
a safe, economic, and attractive energy option. These common goals call on Gen-IV
reactors to:
- Provide sustainable energy generation that meets clean air objectives and
promotes long-term availability of systems and effective fuel utilization for
worldwide energy production;
- Minimize and manage nuclear waste and notably reduce the long term
stewardship burden in the future, thereby improving protection for the public
health and the environment;
- Increase the assurance that they are a very unattractive and least desirable route
for diversion or theft of weapons-usable materials;
- Excel in safety and reliability;
- Have a very low likelihood and degree of reactor core damage;
- Eliminate the need for off-site emergency response;
- Have a clear life-cycle cost advantage over other energy sources;
- Have a level of financial risk comparable to other energy projects.
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It should be taken into account that Generation IV reactors, planned to be deployed in
the US starting year 2030, may be able to produce hydrogen simultaneously while
producing electricity. Indeed this is a major goal of current Department of Energy
research in the US. Today, some power reactors store hydrogen on their sites which they
mostly use to cool main generators or to chemically treat primary coolant water [28].
Most fuel cells run more efficiently on pure hydrogen as opposed to a hydrogen rich fuel
reformed by a chemical reformer; and using pure hydrogen means taking one component
out of the system and eliminating the failure probability associated with it. On the other
hand, while hydrogen is a great energy carrier it has a very low energy per volume ratio;
it is difficult to handle, forming explosive mixtures with air at any concentration between
5% and 95% by volume. It does not store well and its transport is likewise difficult. It
would be realistic to assume that even by 2030, if fuel cells were employed on nuclear
power plant sites, they would be run with fuels denser than hydrogen, such as methane,
propane or kerosene. In addition, it would also be realistic to assume that 25 years from
now the reformers used in fuel cell power plants will have become more reliable and
improved on-site hydrogen storage options will be available.
16
Table 1-2 Generation IV Systems 1281
Neutron Fuel Size Applications R&D
Spectrum Cycle
Sodium Fast Reactor Fast Closed Med Electricity, AM2 Advanced Recycle
(SFR) to Large
Lead-alloy Fast Fast Closed Small Electricity, Fuels, Materials
Reactor (LFR) to Large Hydrogen compatibility
Gas-cooled Fast Fast Closed Med Electricity, Fuels, Materials,
Reactor (GFR) Hydrogen, AM Safety
Very High Temp. Gas Thermal Open Med Electricity, Fuels, Materials,
Reactor (VHTR) Hydrogen, Hydrogen
Process Heat production
SuperCritical Water Thermal, Open, Large Electricity Materials, safety
Reactor (SCWR) Fast Closed
Molten Salt Reactor Thermal Closed Large Electricity, Fuel, fuel treatment,
(MSR) Hydrogen, AM materials, safety and
reliability
1.1.3 Fuel Cell Operation Modes
Common modes of operation for stationary fuel cells can be listed under four
main categories [14]:
- Grid connected
- Grid independent
- Grid connected/grid independent
- Back-up power
- Grid connected/grid independent parallel power
- Utility interconnect.
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2 AM: Actinide Management
Grid connected mode implies constant power output in parallel with the grid. Grid
independent applications mostly refer to sites that are too far away to efficiently connect
to the utility grid. At those locations it might be more feasible to invest in a distributed
generation technology (such as fuel cells) and operate them coupled with wind turbines
or photovoltaic cells. In a grid connected/grid independent mode, the fuel cell power
plant disconnects from the grid automatically in case of a disturbance or failure and
provides independent power. Smaller size fuel cells might be used as portable power
sources, where they would operate independent of the grid. Fuel cells for back-up power
applications are used to improve reliability and in this mode, fuel cells do not provide
power simultaneously with the grid.
For grid connected/grid independent parallel power applications, fuel cells and the
utility power source operate simultaneously. This can be done for peak shaving. Finally
the utility interconnect mode is when the fuel cell not only provides power to the
application but also supplies power to the utility grid, i.e. net metering.
1.2 Objectives
This study focuses on answering two questions:
i. How reliable are fuel cells today for providing back-up power at nuclear power
plants?
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ii. How reliable will fuel cells be when Gen-IV nuclear reactors are deployed in
the US, i.e. by year 2030?
1.3 Scope
There have been several reports published based on the operating experience of
emergency diesel generators at US commercial power plants since 1987 and the latest
update to one of those reports [17] analyzes the data of emergency diesel generator
performance between 1997 and 2003. The data used in this report was obtained from the
Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) database using the Reliability
and Availability Database System (RADS). By the help of this data, the industry-wide
unavailability and unreliability of the diesel generators was calculated.
Fuel cells have never been used at nuclear power plants for backup purposes. In
fact fuel cell systems of sizes comparable to those of emergency diesel generators are not
commercially available today. There are fuel cell systems of comparable size that are
being developed and tested by several different companies, however the data for their
performance has not been made public and therefore it is not possible to conduct a study
similar to the EDG study of [17] to obtain reliability information. In the same manner, the
operation data that exists for fuel cell systems that were used for back-up power purposes
are for systems much smaller in size compared to EDGs.
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For a fuel cell reliability study in the MW range, the most detailed data set
available comes from the Department of Defense (DoD) Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cell
(PAFC) Demonstration Program [6]. Although there are molten carbonate and solid oxide
fuel cell systems in the MW range that have been tested and operated, the data for those
is not readily available. Consequently, this study will use the data from the performance
of 15 PAFCs installed and run by DoD bases.
Since the main objective of this study is to look at the reliability aspect of fuel cell
systems, other important aspects such as economics, emissions, noise, site analysis,
licensing, sizing, electrical and thermal fitting are not included, and left for future work.
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2 Need for On-Site AC Power at Nuclear Power Plants
2.1 Introduction
Nuclear plants have a three level defense-in-depth approach to provide barriers for
fission product release [10]. These are prevention, protection and mitigation.
Prevention, the first level of safety, aims to completely avoid operational
occurrences that could result in system damage, loss of fuel performance or unacceptable
levels of radioactivity release. This is achieved through high reliability and redundancy in
components and systems.
Despite the importance and priority given to prevention, failure of parts is
inevitable during the lifetime of a nuclear reactor (or any system); and therefore a second
level of defense, protection, must be integrated into its design. This part of the defense-
in-depth approach must account for trivial incidents with little or no release of
radioactivity possibility as well as incidents with very low probabilities that might have
catastrophic consequences (i.e. severe core damage accidents have extremely low
probability).
The final level of defense-in-depth, mitigation, is designed to limit the
consequences of accidents, should they occur despite preventative and protective
measures taken. To minimize the damage that would occur after an accident, there are
systems to provide emergency feedwater, core-cooling and electrical power.
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The main objectives of nuclear reactor operation and safety are aimed at providing
sufficient heat removal from the reactor core to prevent overheating and melting (in the
most extreme case). Almost all radioactive products are retained by the nuclear fuel
assemblies and therefore always having adequate means of cooling available is the first
step to ensure safe operation. Having reliable and redundant on-site AC power sources
increases the chances of keeping all system parameters within acceptable limits in case
off-site power (electricity from the grid) is lost.
2.2 Core Cooling
The likelihood of severe fuel damage (and consequently the release of radioactive
products) depends directly on the amount of energy available in the reactor. Adequate
heat removal from the reactor core is required during normal operation (power
generation), shutdown (planned or unplanned), for long term decay heat removal and in
case of an emergency (i.e. a pipe break accident).
Under normal operating conditions, for power reactors heat is removed from the
core by generating and extracting steam that then is passed into a turbine-generator to
produce electricity. Depending on the type of the reactor (BWR or PWR) feedwater
pumps provide coolant to the reactor or steam generator.
During a normal shutdown, initial removal of decay heat in BWRs is by steam
bypass to the condenser with main or auxiliary feedwater pumps. PWRs use their main
22
coolant pumps (or natural circulation) to move primary coolant through steam generators,
from which the auxiliary feedwater system removes heat.
2.3 Emergency Core Cooling
Some of the most important design-basis accidents for light water reactors involve
loss of cooling, either through a decrease in reactor coolant system (RCS) flow rate or
decrease in reactor coolant inventory. Design-basis accidents involve the postulated
failure of one or more important systems, and they serve for a basis for determining the
overall acceptability of a particular reactor design [10]. The emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) has one major function; and that is to provide makeup water to cool the
reactor core in the event of loss of coolant. In some reactor designs, the ECCS also
provides neutron absorbing chemicals to the reactor and RCS to endure the reactor
doesn't provide power [20].
Loss of flow (LOFA) accidents follow a failure of main reactor coolant pumps and
loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) result from rupture of primary piping. In either case,
the loss of ability to remove heat from the fuel may have important and severe
consequences. Most challenging loss of coolant accidents are those resulting from a
double ended guillotine break in one of the large pipes of the primary system [9], and
emergency core cooling systems are needed to ensure that there is sufficient cooling for
the core should this worst case scenario accident occur.
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The availability of electric power to pump coolant, under all circumstances, is vital
to the safety of nuclear power plants, and therefore there are on-site power sources to
supply back-up power in case off-site power is not available. The designers of nuclear
reactors take into consideration natural phenomena, such as earthquakes and tornadoes,
and besides making sure the safety related equipment is redundant and diverse to avoid
common-cause failures.
In addition, safety equipment along with their electrical supply lines is generally
physically separated to reduce damage in case of a fire. On March 22, 1975 a fire was
started in a cable room at the Browns Ferry nuclear power station in Alabama [18], as a
result of carelessness with a lighted candle that was used to detect air leaks in insulation
around electric cables. The fire resulted in the shutdown of two operating nuclear units
that shared the same cable room and made part of the safety system (such as the EECS)
inoperable. After this fire, the safety rules and regulations were changed and cables must
now be placed in separate protected sheathing [19].
The components included in the emergency core cooling systems of BWRs and
PWRs differ slightly in nomenclature. For both types, although consisting of different
subsystems or components, the ECCS is designed to replenish the reactor coolant
inventory for post accident or long term decay heat removal conditions.
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2.4 Current Emergency Core Cooling Practices - Emergency
Diesel Generators
Currently the majority of the light water reactors in the US use diesel generators to
power their safety critical coolant pumps, and a small number use gas turbines. Usually,
there are at least 2 independent emergency diesel generators per reactor unit that are
connected to their safety critical busses. Given the importance of decay heat removal, the
reliability of these diesel generators (or gas turbines) is key to safety. For example, for
Millstone Power Plant Unit 3 (MP-3), the EDGs have the highest value of Fusell-Vesely
risk importance measure for core damage frequency (CDF), meaning the failure of the
EDGs could contribute more to core damage than any other system in the plant [25].
2.5 Mission Statement of EDGs at a Typical Nuclear Power Plant
The power supply at nuclear power plants must be ensured to maintain proper
operation of all key systems and therefore electric power must be available under all
conditions. In the case of loss of off-site power (LOOP), all nuclear plants have on-site
AC power generators to supply power to safety-critical loads until grid power is restored
or the reactor is safely shut down. Figure 2.1 shows a one-line diagram for a typical
power plant that has plant off-site and on-site power sources.
There are 4 paths to supply power to the plant essential load bus for this particular
one-line diagram which covers two units. These are:
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- From the station generator through a motor operated disconnect (MOD) and
through the unit transformer
- From the main grid through the main transformer and then through the unit
transformer
- From the separate grid through the start-up transformer
- Through the on-site AC generators (EDGs) to the safety critical busses only
This plant has three EDGs per unit, and each EDG is isolated to its bus. In case of an
emergency, all non-safety related loads are shed and EDGs only supply power to the
loads on their bus which are safety-critical. The diesel generators 1, 2 and 3 for Unit 1 in
Figure 2.1 are connected to busses H, G and F respectively. The loads on these busses are
listed in Table 2.1 which specifies maximum EDG steady state loading without a safety
injection signal, and on Table 2.2 which lists maximum EDG steady state load following
a LOCA.
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Table 2-1 EDG loading on demand without a safety injection signal [26]
RATIN MAXIMUM DEMAND
LOAD QTY G MAX KW (e)
(EACH) Bus F jBus GIBusH
480V load exclusive of containment
fan coolers, fire pumps, momentary 3 1000 484 414 659loads, and manually controlled loads KVA
(j )
Load Center Transf. & Cable Losses 32 32 32
Component Cooling Water Pumps 3 400 HP 435 HP 342 342 342
Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps 2 400 HP 465 HP 372 372
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2 600 HP 505 HP 395 395
650 HP(F) 620 515 491Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2 600 HP HP(G)
Containment Fan Coolers (b) 5 300 HP 300 HP 480 480 240
Maximum demand on vital 4160 V KW = 2620 2131 1668
buses (c.1) KVAR= 1269 1032 808
KVA = 2911 2368 1853
Fire Pumps (480 V) 2 200 HP 186 HP 147 147
Maximum load demand on the vital KW 2767 2131 1815
4160 V buses concurrent with a fire 1340 1032 879(c. 1) KVAR =
KVA = 3074 2368 2016
Typical ratings for diesel generators used at
- 2600 kW 4 continuous
- 2750 kW - 2000 hour
- 3000 kW 4 2 hour
power plants are:
For a typical plant, during normal operation, the vital 4kV buses F, G and H are
supplied by the main generator, through the unit transformer. In the event of a unit
shutdown or trip they are either manually or automatically shifted to the startup
transformer. For longer term shutdown, the 4kV buses are powered by backfeeding from
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the main grid. In the case of a loss of offsite power, on-site EDGs (generally rated at or
around 2.6 MW) start and load.
Table 2-2 EDG Loading on demand following a safety injection signal (LOCA) [26]
MAXIMUM DEMAND
LOAD QTY RATING MAX KW (e)(EACH) BHP BusF IBusG BusH
480V load exclusive of containment
fan coolers, fire pumps, momentary 3 1000 484 414 659
loads, and manually controlled loads KVA(j) 
Load Center Transf. & Cable Losses 23 23 23
Centrifugal Charging Pumps 2 600 HP 650 HP(F) 620 515 491
1HP(G) _______
Safety Injection Pumps 2 400 HP 417 HP 330 330
Containment Spray Pumps 2 400 HP 440 HP 350 350
Residual Heat Removal Pumps 2 400 HP 420 HP 333 333
Containment Fan Coolers (b) 5 100 HP 103 HP 164 164 82
Component Cooling Water Pumps 3 400 HP 435 HP 342 342 342
Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps 2 400 HP 465 HP 372 372
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 2 600 HP 505 HP 395 395
Maximum demand on vital 4160 V KW = 2625 2489 2514
buses upon a loss-of-coolant KVAR 1478 1412 1321
accident (c.2) KVA- 3013 2862 2839
Fire Pumps (480 V) 2 200 HP 186 HP 147 147
Maximum load demand on the vital KW = 2772 2489 2661
4160 V buses upon a loss-of-coolant KVAR 1549 1412 1392
accident concurrent with a fire (c.2) KVA = 3176 2862 3003
The conditions that will trigger an automatic transfer to diesel generators at a
typical plant are:
- Startup power not available when automatic transfer from auxiliary to startup is
required or
Startup power not unavailable when the vital 4kV bus is on startup power
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In other words, the diesel generators start (but not necessarily load) when there is
undervoltage at the 4kV bus startup feeder, an immediate or delayed decaying loss of
4kV bus voltage, or when there is a safety injection signal, implying that a reactor
parameter is outside of design limits.
When loads are transferred to EDGs without a safety injection signal, the auxiliary
saltwater pumps have to be started 58 seconds after the transfer. When there is a safety
injection signal and diesel generators are started, centrifugal charging pumps, safety
injection pumps and residual heat removal pumps need to be started within 25 seconds of
the SI output.
Average diesel generator mission time is generally assumed to be 8 hours in this
study; however in some real life cases they have had to operate longer than that. During
the 10 year period between 1993 and 2003, 6 losses of off-site power in the US plants
have lasted longer than 8 hours [21]. During the grid blackout that occurred in August
2003, nine US nuclear plants tripped and eight of them lost all off-site power. For those 8
plants, 2 of them had to wait longer than 8 hours before off-site power was restored to the
safeguard busses [21].
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2.6 EDG Train Description
The EDG train is the main part of the on-site emergency AC power system. In the
case of a loss of off-site power, the EDG train will provide power to its associated safety-
related bus. The EDG trains are designed with sufficient capacity to power all the loads
needed for a safe shutdown or core cooling after an accident.
Combustion Lube Oil Fuel Oil Loading &
Air S stem System Sys em Sequencing Circuitry
East Path Diesel Electrical Output
Components En ine Generator Breaker
e Cooling Start System Control
r System Circuitry
Equipment MCC Power Boards Batteries
Figure 2-2 EDG train boundaries 1271
According to [27], the main part consists of the diesel engine, the exhaust
subsystem which consists of the piping and valves to direct the engine exhaust out of the
building and the electrical generator subsystem which consists of the generator casing,
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windings, rotor and exciter that are all involved in bringing power to the output breaker.
The main EDG circuit breaker is included in the output breaker subsystem.
The cooling subsystem is a closed loop contains the pumps, valves and heat
exchangers and an external cooling medium, typically the plant emergency service water.
The start system uses compressed air to start the EDG and it also provides compressed air
to the engine through a system of valves, relief valves, air motors and a distributor. The
instrumentation and control subsystem includes the components that start, stop and
provide operational control to the EDG; which are a mix of pneumatic and electrical
controls. This subsystem also includes the loading and sequencing circuitry.
The combustion air subsystem provides air from the outside into the EDG through
a filter, while the fuel oil subsystem provides fuel from external storage tanks. The
storage capacities of tanks vary from a few days of system operation to a smaller day
tank, which typically has a 4 to 6 hour capacity. The lubrication oil subsystem is integral
to the engine and the generator and it consists of a sump, various pumps and a heat
exchanger.
For the reliability analysis of [27], the equipment motor control centers, the
associated power boards and the batteries that serve as DC back-ups to the normal
instrumentation and control power supply are not included in the boundaries for the EDG
train.
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2.7 EDG Failure Modes
A successful EDG response to a demand would be considered electrical power
being provided to the EDG's safety related bus for the duration of the mission time
specified, after the EDG has successfully started and loaded. There are three main failure
modes associated with diesel engines; failure to start, failure to run and maintenance out
of service.
The conditions that start and load the EDGs may not be the same. For example, the
EDGs are expected to start and load in response to loss of off-site power, but they are
expected to only start in response to a safety injection signal. For practicality, both failure
to start and failure to load are considered under the failure to start (FTS) mode. Following
a bus undervoltage condition a successful start for an EDG train (manual or automatic)
would mean reaching rated voltage and speed, through the output breaker closing and
sequencing safety related electrical loads onto the respective safety related bus.
If the EDG loads successfully and is stable but fails to run for the duration of the
specified mission time, it is classified as a failure to run (FTR). In this case, the EDG
successfully starts and loads, but fails to supply power to its safety related bus.
According to [17], the biggest contributor to EDG unreliability is maintenance out
of service (MOOS). This condition occurred if the EDG was prevented from starting
because of preventative or corrective maintenance.
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In addition to the three failure modes and maintenance out of service described
above, all systems are subject to common cause failures. These can be thought of as a set
of dependent failures resulting from a common mechanism or a coupling factor due to
which more than one system (i.e. EDG trains) fails at the at the same time (or within a
short period of time). An example [27] is a case where two relief valves fail to open at the
required pressure because their set points were set too high. They fail due to a common
calibration procedure and common maintenance procedure. Each component fails
because of conditions created by a root cause, but the coupling factor makes it common
for several components. Coupling factors are grouped into five categories [27]:
" Hardware quality
- Hardware Design
- Maintenance
- Operations
- Environment
and they are not different from the root causes of component failures. It was found that
57% of the 138 common cause failures that occurred in the EDGs on US nuclear plant
sites between 1980 and 2000 [27] were fail-to-run problems and the review of the data
suggests that in order for these failures to be developed and detected, the EDGs had to be
running. Fuel cells could introduce an improvement to this weakness in that they could
always be kept running at low power and be switched up to rated power on demand. This
way, they would eliminate failure to start because they already had been started and
loaded before the demand, significantly bringing down the failure-to-run frequency but
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not completely eliminating it since component failures or complications while increasing
power can happen at any time.
2.8 EDG Failure Examples
Although diesel engines have been around for a long time and have accumulated
millions of operating hours, the results of [17] shows that the events associated with
EDGs bring their reliability below the 95% target. Table 2.3 shows unplanned demand
and failures for EDGs on US nuclear plant sites, from operating experience between
1987-1993 and Table 2.4 shows the industry-wide unavailability and unreliability
covering the period between years 1997 and 2003. While Table 2.4 includes the
possibility of recovery after failure, the data presented in Table 2.3 does not.
Table 2-3 Selected EDG train failures and unplanned demands [17]
Plant name Number of Operation Failures Failure Unplanned DemandPlantnameEDGs Years Rate Demands Rate
Arkansas 2 2 7.00 2 0.14 1 0.07
Catawba 1 2 7.00 20 1.43 3 0.21
Catawba 2 2 7.00 14 1.00 0 0.0
Diablo 3 7.00 4 0.19 4 0.19Canyon 1
McGuire 2 2 7.00 16 1.14 5 0.36
Salem 1 3 7.00 0 0.00 9 0.43
Salem 2 3 7.00 11 0.52 4 0.19
South 3 6.36 25 1.31 11 0.58
Texas 1
Catawba plant unit 1 had the second highest failure rate in the industry, within the
specified time period. Most of its failures were classified as failure to start [17]. The
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majority of the failures were associated with instrumentation and control subsystems,
which applied to Catawba 2 as well. For McGuire 2, the failure rate was 1.14 per EDG-
year, and most failures were related to maintenance or operator error, with no clear
majority being associated with a subsystem. For South Texas 1, the major contributors to
the failures were automatic trip circuitry and voltage regulator. Detailed information
about EDG failures for most US plants can be found in [17].
Table 2-4 Industry wide FTS unavailability and 7-hr mission unreliability, 1997-2003 [171
Model Lower (5%) Mean Upper (95%)
No FTS (unavailability) 9.82E-03 1.63E-02 2.40E-02
recovery 7-hr mission 1.40E-02 2.26E-02 3.29E-02(unreliability)
With FTS (unavailability) 9.30E-03 1.39E-02 1.93E-02
Recovery 7-hr missions 1.12E-02 1.71E-02 2.4E-02(unreliability)
2.9 Summary
This chapter briefly explains why on-site AC power is needed at nuclear power
plants. Although nuclear plants are designed with a multi-level defense-in-depth
approach, accidents do happen and to be able to provide electrical power to cool the
reactor core is vital to safety. For the majority of the nuclear plants in the US when off-
site power is lost, electricity is supplied to safety-critical components by on-site
emergency diesel generators. The EDGs are rated around 2.5-2.6 MW and they have to
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provide power to safety critical pumps within 25 seconds if there is a safety injection
signal and within 58 seconds without a safety injection signal.
There are three failure modes associated with EDGs; failure to start, failure to run
and maintenance out of service. With no recovery, the industry wide average
unavailability of the EDGs on US nuclear plant sites was 0.0163 while the average
unreliability for a 7 hour mission was 0.0226, between the period 1997 and 2003. Prior to
that, some plants experienced EDG failures as often as once per reactor year.
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3 Fuel Cell Technologies and Applications Today
3.1 Introduction
A fuel cell is an electrochemical device that can continuously convert the chemical
energy of a fuel and an oxidant into electrical energy [7]. Fuel cell systems are made up
by stacking a number of individual cells (0.7~1 V each) to obtain a desired voltage level.
Their modularity allows them to be configured in a large range of sizes; starting from a
few kilowatts to tens of megawatts.
The operating principle of fuel cells is almost the same as the everyday batteries we
use for different purposes; with a major difference being in the way fuel is located.
Batteries (both primary and secondary) store the substances that contain the chemical
energy inside them, and after consumption they are either thrown away (primary
batteries) or recharged (secondary batteries). On the contrary, in a fuel cell, the chemical
energy that is converted to electricity is supplied by the fuel and oxidant that are both
outside the cell, and the cell produces electricity as long as these are provided. The fuel
cell stack is where the chemical reactions take place. This electrochemical way of energy
conversion is one of the major differences that bring fuel cells the advantage of not being
limited by Carnot cycle efficiencies.
3.2 Fuel Cell Types
There are four main types of fuel cells that are currently under research and
development which are relatively more commercially available than other types that
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exist. Categorized according to the electrolyte material, these are: molten carbonate fuel
cell (MCFC), phosphoric acid fuel cell (PAFC), proton exchange membrane fuel cell
(PEMFC) and solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC).Table 3.1 shows important characteristics of
these four fuel cell types.
Table 3-1 Comparison of key features of four main types of fuel cells [11
MCFC PAFC PEMFC SOFC
Electrolyte Immobilized liquid Immobilized Ion exchange Ceramic
molten carbonate liquid membrane
phosphoric
acid
Operating 650 0C 2050 C 800 C 800-1000 C now,
temperature 600-1000 C in 10-
15 years
Charge carrier C03- H+ H+ 0-
Ext. CH4 No Yes Yes No
reformer
Prime cell Stainless Steel Graphite- Carbon-Based Ceramic
components Based
Catalyst Nickel Platinum Platinum Perovskites
Product water Gaseous product Evaporative Evaporative Gaseous product
management
Product heat Internal reforming + Process gas + Process gas + Internal reforming
management process gas independent independent + process gas
cooling cooling medium
medium
Anode H2 + C02-3 4 H2 + O2- 4 H20
reactions H20 + C02 + + 2e-
2e- H2 + 2 H2 - 2 H++2e- CO + 02- - C02
CO + C02-3 - H++2e- + 2e-
2 C02 + 2e- CH4 + 402- 4
2H20 + C02 +
8e-
Cathode 1/202 + C02 + 2e- 4 1/202 + 2 1/202 + 2 H++ 2e-
reactions C02-3 H++ 2e- 4 - H20 1/202 + 2e- 4 02-
H20
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In Section 3.6, model PC25C phosphoric acid fuel cells are explained in further
detail as they provide the data for this study.
3.2.1 Operation Principles
Fuel cells convert chemical energy of a fuel and an oxidant directly into electrical
energy, without performing intermediate conversions of the fuel to thermal and
mechanical energy. A single fuel cell has two electrodes (anode and cathode) and an
electrolyte material, such as phosphoric acid or molten carbonate. The fuel and oxidant
(air) are delivered to the cell separately; the fuel is fed to the anode and the oxidant is fed
to the cathode. Following oxidation and reduction reactions that take place at the
electrodes, water as the primary product is produced along with electric current.
Because of their higher efficiencies in generating electricity and lower fuel
oxidation temperatures [15] fuel cells produce less C02 and NOx per kW of power
generated and due to not having any moving parts, the failure rates of parts are much
lower, and noise and vibration are non-existent.
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Figure 3-1 Schematic of an individual fuel cell [15]
A single fuel cell produces between 0.6 to 1 Volts of electrical potential. To
obtain a desired voltage level, individual fuel cells are stacked with the help of bipolar
separator plates. These plates have two functions; to provide an electrical series
connection between cells and to provide a gas barrier that separates the fuel and oxidant
of adjacent cells [31]. Figure 3.3 shows the parts of a fuel cell stack including a single
cell (anode, cathode, electrolyte, oxidant and current flow path) and the separator plates.
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3.3 Fuel Cell Power Plants
Balance of plant support systems are required to successfully configure a fuel cell
system to meet the needs of a site. Fuel cell power plants typically consist of two main
subsystems besides the cell stack (power section) in which the chemical reaction takes
place. These are the fuel processing subsystem and the power conditioner. Figure 3.1
shows a typical fuel cell system configuration.
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Heat & Water
Figure 3-3 Typical fuel cell power plant including the power section, the fuel processor and the
power conditioner [5]
The fuel processor allows operation with non-pure hydrogen fuels such as
methane and propane. Hydrogen is extracted (or "reformed") from a hydrogen rich fuel
and then it is fed into the power section.
The power section (the fuel cell stack) is made up of a series of cells, each of
which contain two electrodes (anode and cathode) and an electrolyte.
The power conditioner includes an inverter that converts the DC output of fuel
cells into AC electricity. It also regulates the fuel cell's voltage and current output to
match various load profiles and provides power to fuel cell auxiliary devices.
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In addition to these main subsystems, there are other subsystems that are needed
to maintain proper operation of the fuel cell system. These are the air, thermal and water
management systems.
The air management subsystem delivers air at proper temperature, pressure and
humidity. The air required for the fuel cell stack and the fuel processor is usually supplied
by a compressor at pressures of 2 to 10 atms depending on the fuel cell type.
Fuel and air streams must be conditioned to the proper temperature before
entering the stack. The thermal management subsystem transfers heat from/to various
components to provide the proper operating temperature for the stack. It consists of a
network of heat exchangers, fans, pumps and compressors that are required to heat and
cool the various process streams entering and leaving the fuel cell and the fuel processor.
All systems must provide for stack cooling, (heat recovery for cogeneration) and reactant
preheating or precooling. The amount of heat released during the fuel cell operation is
comparable to the amount of electricity provided - this heat must be removed from the
stack (It can be recovered for cogeneration).
If needed, a water management subsystem ensures water is available for fuel
processing and reactant humidification.
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3.4 Fuel Cell Application Types
As environmental awareness is increasing worldwide, fuel cells with significantly
low emission values are becoming the preferred distributed generation technologies for
many applications. Utilities, businesses and residences are all required to limit their
emissions by law enforcement or high taxes. Fuel cells have received special benefits
from some states in the US and many governments in the world due to their highly
efficient and low-polluting manner of operation.
It is possible to list the major fuel cell applications under stationary and
transportation applications.
3.4.1 Stationary Applications
Fuel cell power plants ranging from1 kW to 15 kW are being used in residences
today, either in parallel with the grid or independently. Power plants up to 500 kW serve
hotels, schools, hospitals, office buildings and shopping malls. The majority of these
power plants provide heating and/or cooling and/or domestic hot water besides producing
efficient and cheap electricity. The high temperature ones generally operate in
cogeneration mode. Fuel cells are ideal for locations where there is limited or no access
to the electrical grid. Data centers that have in excess of 100 watt /ft2 power use density
have very high demands [8] for highly reliable and premium quality power and most of
them employ fuel cells. The most common uses of fuel cells for distributed generation are
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for peak shaving, cogeneration, grid support, standby power and remote power. These
systems have small footprints and their modularity makes them a top choice. A list of
technologies that are competing with fuel cells for the stationary market is provided in
Table 3-2.
3.4.2 Transportation Applications
The increasing global need for efficient vehicles with lower emissions has
resulted in significant research and development in the application of fuel cells for light-
duty and heavy-duty vehicles. In contrast to conventional fuels such as gasoline or diesel,
hydrogen burning engines would have zero emissions. The on-board hydrogen-rich fuels
could be reformed into hydrogen with a processor, yielding high efficiency and low
emissions [31]. The most common fuel cell type used for transportation applications is
the proton exchange membrane fuel cell (PEMFC).
Major automobile manufacturers such as General Motors, Volkswagen, Volvo,
Chrysler, Nissan, Ford and Toyota all have PEMFC prototype vehicles operating on
different fuels. As mentioned in [31], DaimlerChrysler's NECAR 5 fuel cell powered
vehicle was tested on a 13-day, 3000 mile trip across the US, under various conditions.
Also Honda's FCX-V4 has been the first vehicle to receive both CARB and EPA
certifications of zero emissions.
In addition to propulsion, fuel cells are also being tested as auxiliary power units
(APUs) for vehicles. They serve as generators, batteries or battery replacements.
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Table 3-2 Competing distributed generation technologies 1151
Types Size Eff Markets
PEM (800C) l-500kW 40% L&MT, residential,PEM 800 ) 1-00k 400 PP RP
Fuel cells PAFC(200 C) 50kW- 40% MT, commercial1.2MW cogeneration, PP
MCFC(650 0 C) 1-20MW 55% HTPP
Residential,
SOFC(1 0000 C) 1kW-25MW 45-65% commercial,
Cogeneration, PP, RP
SP for commercial and
Diesel 50kW-6MW 33-36% small industrial, T&D
support
Internal PP and commercial
Engines combustion- 5kW-2MW 33-35% cogeneration
natural gas
Stirling engine 1-25kW 20% Residential, RP
Combustion Microturbines 25-500kW 2 6 -3 0 % 
coen raticommercial
Turbines Industrial
'Small' turbines 1-100MW 33-45% cogeneration, T&D
support
RP, peak shaving,
Renewables Solar (PV) 1-1000kW 10-20% power quality ,greenpower
Wind RP, peak shaving,
Biomass green power
3.5 Available Fuel Cell Data
3.5.1 Before Commercialization
Fuel cells came into existence following William Robert Grove's experiments in
the 1800s (which he called "gas batteries") and drew the attention of many scientists from
then on. Their development was relatively slow-paced due to the wide-spread acceptance
of combustion technology during the industrial revolution and the fact that not much was
known about electricity before that time. In the early 1900s a British researcher named
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Francis Thomas Bacon thought fuel cells would provide a good source of power for
Royal Navy submarines [3]; however his research was put on hold with the start of the
Second World War. Resuming his work in the late 1950s, Bacon used potassium oxide
(KOH) electrolytes in his fuel cells instead of the acid electrolytes that were being used
since Grove's time; and his work was licensed by Pratt&Whitney for the Apollo
spacecraft.
It was probably their use on the Apollo spacecraft that brought international
research focus back to fuel cells. The Apollo spacecraft carried three hydrogen-oxygen
fuel cells in its service module each of which contained 31 individual fuel cells,
connected in series. These fuel cells provided electricity to their busses independently.
Normal power output was 563 to 1420 Watts [4] with a maximum of 2300 Watts. As the
fuel cells operated, oxygen and hydrogen combined to produce water, which the Apollo
crew used for drinking. At that time, fuel cell costs were in the order of millions of
dollars per kW electricity; they are in the low thousands today, gradually decreasing and
becoming more competitive with other distributed generation technologies.
3.5.2 The U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center's
Construction Engineering Research Laboratory
(USAERDC/CERL) Fuel Cell Demonstration Program
The first fuel cell power plant became commercially available in 1992; and that
was the ONSI PC25 Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cell (PAFC). Following this, in FY 1993 and
FY 1994 the Defense Appropriations Act provided a total of $36.75M for purchase and
installation of natural gas fuel cells at DoD sites [2]. With these funds and availability of
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the PC25 fuel cell, DoD took the opportunity to evaluate the fuel cell technology as a
replacement for existing outdated equipment on some of its facilities.
With their program, a total of 30 fuel cell power plants were installed in 17 US
states ranging from Florida to Alaska. Out of these 30 power plants 15 were PC25Cs
whose technical specifications [5] are given in Table 3.2. The remaining were 14 PC25B
power plants and a single PC25A power plant installed at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
CA, which was shut down only after 2500 hours due to site-specific problems. The fleet
of 14 model PC25B's was shut down by ONSI since they showed signs of excessive
stack voltage degradation within a few months of startup. (It was later concluded that this
degradation problem occurred for plants in very hot regions, requiring significantly more
make-up water.)
Table 3-3 ONSI Corporation PC25C fuel cell plant characteristics [51
Characteristic Measure
Rated electric capacity 200/235
Voltage/frequency 480 Volts/3-phase/4-wire/60hz
Fuel 1900 SCFH Nominal;
40% electrical efficiency at LHV basis
Sound level 62 Dba at 30 ft.
Ambient temp -2011F to +11ODF
Thermal Output (H20) 700,000 BTU/hr @ 140 E F
Power plant dimensions 18' Long X 10' Wide X 10' High; 40,000 lbs.
Cooling module dimensions 14' Long X 4' Wide X 4' High; 1,700 lbs.
In this study, only the data for 15 model PC25C power plants is used.
Although the major objectives of the DoD demonstration program were to help
lower the costs of fuel cells by stimulating their growth in industry and to determine what
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role they would play in DoD's long term energy strategy, it is important to add that they
have provided very valuable operating data for researchers that is publicly available and
easily accessible. The DoD PAFC Demonstration program provides the most detailed set
of data that is available today for fuel cells of size greater than 100 kW.
The DoD fleet of 30 power plants were installed at a variety of building types,
that are briefly explained below. These sites were selected according to the following
criteria [6]:
- Geographic diversity
- Application diversity
- Fuel cell utilization at site
- Energy savings
As these criteria indicate, the primary purpose of these installations were to achieve a
maximum utilization of the power plants yielding both thermal and electrical outputs, in
addition to cutting energy costs of the selected sites. All 30 power plants operated in
parallel with the electrical grid. A brief description of these sites can be summarized from
[5] as below (summarized in Table 3.2):
Central Heating Plants
"These facilities consist of one or more boilers and steam or hot water distribution system that
provides thermal energy to outlying buildings. The key PAFC power plant interfaces are either
preheating boiler make-up water or heating the return condensate or hot water from the
distribution loop.
The make-up water requirement for a central heating plant is a function of the distribution
system's integrity. Distribution systems with leaks will require a higher volume of make-up water
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than systems that are thermally tight. The boiler return loop provides an integration point for the
fuel cell but is dependent on the typical return temperatures and how they match up with the
characteristics of the PAFC power plant."
Hospitals
"Hospitals are very energy
intensive. Larger facilities may
have their own central plant Kite
systems where boiler make-up Control Center
water or the return loop are
potential thermal interfaces to Industrial
the PAFC power plant. In Laboratory
addition to these loads, e Buildings
domestic hot water (DHW), (2) Central Heating
space heating, space cooling Plants
(with absorption chillers) and
therapy/swimming Pools Gymnasium/Pool
represent potential thermal (3)
applications."
Dormitory/Barracks
Dorrns/Barracks
"Large scale residence facilities (
represent potential for thermally
integrating a PAFC power plant. Hospitals
DHW loads are usually the (7)
largest thermal loads for this
building type and can be further
enhanced when laundry Figure 3-4 DoD fuel cell demonstration program building
facilities are part of the DHW applications [5]
system. Recirculation loops also
represent a potential thermal load for the fuel cell. Particularly at military bases, DHW demand is
concentrated in the early morning and evening periods. The integration of a PAFC power plant
could require a storage tank, depending on the site thermal load usage profile."
Gymnasium/Pool
"Gymnasiums require DHW as well as space heating and cooling. A significant load could also
be heating the swimming pool. An indoor pool with year round use would likely provide a steady
thermal load for the PAFC power plant. Out- door pools may be subject to higher heat losses than
indoor pools, but they often do not operate year round except in mild climates."
Office Buildings
"Office buildings do not usually have large DHW loads. Space heating is a potential thermal
application, but may be limited to weekday hours. Space cooling is also a potential thermal
application for the PAFC power plant where absorption chilling equipment is an option."
Laundry
51
"Commercial or industrial type laundries that operate two or more shifts per day, 6 days per week
way represent a significant thermal load for the fuel cell. Washers require hot water that can be
supplied by a fuel cell, but steam requirements cannot be met with the PAFC power plant."
Kitchen
"DHW loads for washing and food preparation are the most significant thermal loads in a kitchen
or galley. Temperature requirements for individual loads should be observed since health
standard requirements must be met. As with other DHW loads, a hot water storage tank may be
required to accommodate variations in loads."
Boiler Boiler
Make-up Retum Domestic Space Absorption Pool
Water Loop Hot Water Heating Cooling Heating
Central heating plant X X
Hospital X X X X X X
Dormitory/barracks X X X
Gymnasiurn/pool X X X X
Office building X X X
Laundry X X X
Kitchen X X X
3.6 PAFC Model PC25C
The DoD fleet started out with 30 power plants; one model PC25A, 14 model
PC25B's and 15 model PC25C's. This study only uses the data that belongs to the 15
PC25C power plants as several performance issues seen with PC25B's were solved in
model PC25C's. The overall lifelong unadjusted availability of the PC25C fleet is 37.5%
higher than that of the PC25B fleet.
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Figure 3-5 ONSI Corporations model PC25C
fuel cell; world's first commercially available
fuel cell power plant [6]
The PC25C power plant is developed by United Technologies Corporation (UTC),
partnered with Japanese Toshiba Corporation and Italian Ansaldo SpA. The technical
characteristics of this plant are presented in Table 3.2. It was the world's first
commercially available fuel cell power plant and the plants achieve 40% LHV electric
efficiency and up to 80% efficiency for cogeneration applications [31]. Table 3.3 lists the
potential cogeneration applications for the selected DoD sites. It is estimated that cell
stacks have a lifetime of 5 to 7 years. They have been installed at locations with
conditions varying from -32'C to 49'C. Their sound pressure level is about 62 dBA at 9
meters from the unit. One plant installed in a Japanese office building ran for a
continuous 9,500 hours and was shut down for mandated maintenance.
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Figure 3-6 DoD Fuel Cell Demonstration sites [61
According to [2] and [31], the US Postal Service in Alaska houses a large
commercial fuel cell system with five PC25C fuel cells. Seven PC25C's have been
installed at a Verizon facility on Long Island, NY to provide primary power for a critical
call routing center, providing 1.4 MW of electricity. Eight PC25C's have been purchased
by the New York Power Authority to provide power for (and reduce emissions from)
wastewater treatment plants in Brooklyn, Staten Island Bronx and Queens.
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3.7 Problems with the Available Data
3.7.1 Power Plant Technology
PC25TM is the world's only commercially available fuel cell power system [32];
it arrived in the market in 1992. It is the 4th generation of the 200kW fuel cells produced
by UTC since their experimentation began in 1988. The fuel cell operation data that
constitutes the base for this study is for a period of 34,176 hours between September 6,
1997 and July 31, 2001. Consequently, the fuel cell technology that was used for the
PC25C power plants reflects that of the year 1992 or earlier and differs greatly from the
commercially available PureCelTM (formerly PC25) product today. As an example, the
weight and volume of the first models of PC25C were each reduced by 50% over a 7 year
period [39].
While it is hard to quantify the improvements that will happen with time and
experience and integrate them into the reliability analysis, it is safe to say that the
advances made within the 13 year period between the first introduction of the PC25
system to the market and today, when it is being used by customers in 19 countries [32],
the older results provide a minimum for system performance in terms of reliability and
availability. If this analysis were to be repeated today for 35,000 hours of recent
PureCellTM operation, the findings would surely reflect a more realistic estimate for the
suitability of fuel cells to provide back-up power at nuclear power plants. As the power
plant design evolved from PC25A to PC25C, the periodic replacement period extended
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from 3 to 6 months for the water treatment system resins (while the power plant is
operating) and this can be thought of as an example of how fuel cells will have matured
by 2030.
3.7.2 Power Plant Size
The PC25C power plants are available in 200 kW stacks. Currently, while there is
a relatively larger selection in commercially available fuel cell systems under 2 kW, the
Fuel Cell Store [32] lists only a "custom" order option for stacks up to 50 kW and the
only system of greater size available is the 200 kW PureCelITM . As Tables 1.1 and 1.2
show, the work that the diesel generators have to do in order to power the safety critical
components require them to be rated around 2.5 MW. Although individual fuel cells can
be stacked to reach a desired power output level, the stacking brings along compatibility
and performance problems.
On the other hand, at one of the DoD sites for their PAFC demonstration program
(US Postal Services Main Processing Center in Anchorage, AK) five PC25C power
plants were installed to replace their existing and inadequate back-up diesel generator and
UPS system. This site experienced frequent momentary outages that caused their mail
sorters to be shut down, requiring at least two hours for clearing and restarting them [2].
The peak load of this facility was estimated to be around 800 kW and the five fuel cells
were operated in parallel to the utility grid during normal operation (supplying all power
to the site) and they seamlessly transferred to the grid-independent mode of operation. It
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is also emphasized in [2] that at the time of its writing (13 months after the installation)
the Processing Center had not yet experienced any loss of power.
3.7.3 Power Plant Operation Purpose and Response Time
Out of the 30 phosphoric acid fuel cell systems installed by the DoD, only seven
of them were configured to provide back up power in case of a grid instability or failure,
and only two of those were model PC25C's. They operated in the grid-connected/grid
independent operating mode, providing constant power in parallel with the grid and
automatically disconnecting to provide power independently in case of a grid failure.
Model PC25C's do come with an optional 'load shed' operating mode, which would
ensure that only safety-critical loads are supported and all others are shed. In the case of
operation on a nuclear power plant site, the fuel cells would be kept operating all the time
at a power rating lower than the maximum demand, either helping in peak-shaving or
supporting other non-safety related applications that require AC power and would be
switched to full power in case of a demand, being independent of the grid at all times.
While the DoD tested power plants were also run continuously, for the majority of the
time they were required to generate electricity at a constant output value (usually at
maximum power) and consequently it was not possible to observe the response time to
power up and complications that might have arose from a 90-100% increase of required
power.
While it is clear that the purpose of operation of the DoD fleet was different than
fuel cells that would be used to offer higher reliability at nuclear power plants, besides
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being the most complete set of data available, this data provides good information about
the performance of parts and sub-systems of a fuel cell system independent of the fuel
cell type; as it can be concluded that the biggest contributors to fuel cell unavailability are
the support systems and not the fuel cell stack itself.
As long as the fuel cells are at operating temperatures, they respond to load
changes as quickly as 10 % load change/second [35] which suggests in less than 10
seconds a fuel cell plant generating 1000kW can increase its power up to 2500kW. The
ramp rate for grid independent operation of PC25C fuel cell power plants is specified as
-one cycle [31] instantaneous from idle to 200kW. It is also specified in [31] that
following the initial ramp to full power, the unit adjusts at a 80 kW/sec rate (up or down)
in one cycle. While these are satisfying results for 200 kW fuel cells, they do not, and the
data used for this study does not, include the ramp-up characteristics for larger fuel cells.
However, although with 1992 technology, it is promising to see that fuel cell stacks
respond well to load transients [39]; in response to a 40% load transient, the power plant
delivers power immediately while recovering voltage in less than 50 ms.
3.7.4 Fuel Variation
Fuel cells can operate on a variety of fuels and employ one of several reforming
methods to generate hydrogen from a hydrogen-rich fuel. Low temperature fuel cells,
such as phosphoric acid fuel cells, require hydrogen for operation. Typical hydrogen rich
fuels include natural gas, LPG, methanol, ethanol, gasoline, diesel, landfill gas and
gasified coal. The DoD fleet of 15 model PC25C's all operated on natural gas. The use of
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non-pure hydrogen requires the use of a 'reformer', a component that is used to extract
hydrogen from hydrogen-rich fuels. While it is not difficult to predict that the first choice
of fuel for any fuel cell power plant would be natural gas due to the existing pipelines and
storage experience, it would be reasonable to say that the production of hydrogen on
nuclear reactor sites would encourage the use of pure hydrogen for fuel cells that would
be installed on nuclear power plant sites. The DoD fleet data reflect problems with fuel
cell system reformers and site-specific natural gas problems which may not apply for fuel
cells that would be run with pure hydrogen, generated and stored on-site.
3.7.5 Power Plant Monitoring, Repair and Maintenance
For DoD's phosphoric acid fuel cell demonstration program the main criterion for
selection of installation sites were the difference between the cost of electricity and
natural gas, making sure that the use of fuel cells would result in savings [2]. The
monitoring, maintenance and repair of the installed power plants were carried out by
USAERDC/CERL personnel. The analysis of the data shows (Chapter 5) that repair of
these fuel cell systems at most sites was not considered a top priority, as most power
plants operated in parallel with the grid and they did not supply emergency or back-up
power. Some forced outage durations are on the order of hundreds of hours which is
clearly not acceptable for operation on a nuclear site. According to [40], the mean time to
repair for emergency diesel generators on nuclear power plant sites is between 6-18
hours.
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3.7.6 Power Plant Configuration
For this study, it was not possible to obtain the physical configuration of every
sub-system for the fuel cell power plant. Limited information was available through [30]
and [34] but detailed drawings were needed to construct the fault trees in order to
calculate system reliability and availability. In order to solve this problem, all sub-
systems of the fuel cell power plant were assumed to be connected in series; meaning that
the outage of one sub-system would lead to the outage of the entire fuel cell power plant.
Similarly, while calculating the availability and reliability of a sub-system based upon the
performance of its components, every component was assumed to be in series to the
others, again, implying that the failure of a single component would cause the failure of
the entire sub-system.
While this is certainly not the real life case as many parts and sub-systems can be
repaired without bringing the power plant off-line, it adds extra conservatism to the
results of this study by assuming the failure of any component leads to system failure.
3.8 Summary
A fuel cell generates electricity electrochemically without any moving parts. An
individual cell generates about 1 V and cells can be stacked according to a desired
voltage level. The 200 kW PC25C power plant is the first fuel cell power plant to be
offered commercially; it is designed and manufactured by UTC Fuel Cells. Besides the
power generating stack, a fuel cell system has a fuel processing sub-system and a power
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conditioner. Due to their high efficiency, low (almost zero) emissions, noise and the
ability to utilize different fuels, fuel cells are increasingly being used for generating
electricity in many buildings and vehicles. The USAERD/CERL Fuel Cell Demonstration
Program provides the most detailed operation data that is available which consists of 30
phosphoric acid power plant operation history. Only the data for 15 of those plants (that
are model C) were used in this study. Due to reasons such as the old technology used,
smaller power plant size, different operation purpose and type of fuel used, bad
maintenance practices and lack of further information regarding power plant sub-system
configurations, the analysis of this data provides a rough and conservative estimate to the
potential high reliability and availability characteristics fuel cells can obtain.
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4 Methodology
4.1 Introduction
It is important for all engineering systems to be able to evaluate their reliability
throughout their planning, design and operation phases. As technologies get more
complex, the consequences of a component or system failure can become more
catastrophic and expensive; bringing out the significance of defining and quantifying risk
levels beforehand. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a decision support tool that
helps engineers and managers find design and operational weaknesses in complex
systems for the purposes of improving their safety and performance in an efficient
manner [23]. It is an effective tool used to identify and quantify hazards.
Although methods to perform risk (and reliability) assessment originated in the US
aerospace and missile programs in the early 1960s, their use in the nuclear industry added
improvements and credibility to these methods. They then spread to other industries such
as petrochemical, offshore platforms and defense. PRAs have proven very successful in
uncovering design and operation weaknesses that can be overlooked by engineers and
managers.
4.2 The Steps of a Full-Scope PRA
The main questions a PRA asks are:
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- What can go wrong?
- How likely is it?
- What are the consequences?
The steps of a full-scope PRA study according to [23] are defined as;
1. Defining the objectives
2. System familiarization
3. Identification of initiating events
4. Scenario modeling
5. Failure modeling
6. Data collection
7. Quantification and integration
8. Uncertainty analysis
9. Sensitivity analysis
10. Importance ranking.
To begin the PRA analysis, the objectives sought and the undesirable consequences
that constitute the end states of a scenario must be well defined (step 1). In order to
represent the system under consideration most accurately, all the relevant information,
drawings and procedures need to be considered (step 2) and a complete set of initiating
events that could trigger sequences of events that might lead to the end states should be
identified (step 3). The next step (step 4) is to model each accident scenario with
inductive logic and probabilistic tools called event trees. Figure 4-1 shows a sample
event tree. An event tree starts with the occurrence of a given initiating event and
progresses through the scenario considering the success of failure or the next event in the
sequence, until the end state is reached.
Each failure associated with an event in an accident scenario is usually modeled (step
5) probabilistic tools called fault trees, explained in detail in the next section. In order to
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quantify the accident scenarios and identify the main contributors, component data
(failure rate, repair time, failure probabilities...) need to be collected and processed (step
6). The fault trees drawn for different events are then combined together and quantified
using an integrated PRA computer code, and uncertainty analyses are performed to
determine the degree of confidence in the calculated numerical risk results (steps 7 and
8). In order to determine the value changes of which inputs (or elements) cause the
greatest changes in partial or final risk results, sensitivity analysis (step 9) can be
Onsite DC
Loss of Coolant Reactor Trip Off-Site Power Onsite Power Power for ECCS
Accident Instrumeptation
I~ OKI
10K
2 DAMAGE
3 DAMAGE
40K
5 DAMAGE
6 DAMAGE
7 DAMAGE
8 DAMAGE
Figure 4-1 Event tree for a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA); step 4
performed and finally the lead contributors to risk in accident sequences can be identified
(step 10).
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A "limited-scope" PRA is one that applies the steps outlined above but focuses on
mission-related end states instead of all applicable end states. Similarly, a "simplified"
PRA is one that identifies and quantifies major (rather than all) risk contributors,
containing a reduced set of scenarios designed to capture only the more likely mission
risk contributors [23].
4.3 Basic Definitions of Reliability and Availability
4.3.1 Reliability
Reliability is defined as the probability of mission success of a component (or
system, sub-system etc) to operate under designated operating conditions for a
designated period of timet.
Independent of the type and complexity of the system under consideration, there
are three major steps to analyzing the reliability of a system [38]:
- Construction of a reliability model
- Analysis of the model and generation of results
- Interpretation of the results.
Almost all of the time, the results obtained will not be precise enough, and
confidence limit based risk values must be established in order to address the
uncertainties.
In most cases, knowledge of the mean time to failure (MTTF) of a component is
sufficient to asses its usefulness. If the reliability function of a component is R (t), the
MTTF can be found as:
MTTF = JR(t)dt . Equation I
0
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Similarly, if k represents the failure rate for a component, then the MTTF is given
by its reciprocal (given that k is constant):
1
MTTF - . Equation 2
Periodic preventative maintenance increases the MTTF of components and
reduces the frequency of repairs (for repairable components).
4.3.2 Availability
The concept of availability reflects the combined influences of failure and repair.
It can be formulated as the ratio of the expected 'up' time to the sum of expected
'up' and 'down' times.
A = . u :uptime d : downtime
u+d
Equation 3
Similarly, the unavailability is the probability that a system will not be operating
successfully at a given time t. The measure of maintainability of a component is its mean-
time-to-repair (MTTR). If the repair rate of a component is given by p, its MTTR is the
reciprocal (for the case that g is constant):
MT TF - Equation 4
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From Equation 3, availability can also be obtained as a function of k and pt as:
Equation 5
and as a function of MTTF and MTTR:
A MTTF
MTTF + MTTR
Equation 6
4.4 Fault Tree Analysis
The fault tree technique is an analytical method for acquiring information about a
system. It is a graphic model that contains an undesirable event or state of the system at
the top, intermediate events (failures) in the middle, leading to the top event and basic
events at the very bottom whose occurrence in suitable combinations ultimately causes
the top event to occur. The events represented in a fault tree are linked together through
logic gates that determine the logical relationship between them. A fault tree analysis
aims to identify all credible ways an undesired event can occur, given certain basic
events.
Figure 4-3 shows a simple fault tree for "failure of the power section system".
PWRSECTIOT,SYSTEM
FAILUR OF-PSS
GROUND FREEZE FREEZE HALFSTACK
DEETO PREVENTION PREVENTIONOLTGE
GFD-001 HTR3IOA HTR310B VT310
Figure 4-2 Sample fault tree showing the failure of power section system as the top event
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A = 9
pU+
The basic events can be any possible failure event, ranging from component
failures to human errors. These events are inputs to the system whereas the higher events
are outputs. The logic gates between them show the relationships needed for the
occurrence of a higher event. It must be noted that although a very effective and efficient
tool, fault tree analysis can not model all possible system failures or possible causes of
system failures.
In this study, the computer code SAPHIRE [13] was used for the fault tree
analysis. SAPHIRE stands for Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated
Reliability Evaluations and was developed for the Division of Systems Technology,
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC). With this software, fault trees can be constructed and analyzed to obtain different
measure of system unreliability. These system measures are [13]:
- Overall system failure probability (with a choice of either an
approximation or the exact probability
- Minimal cut sets size, number, and probability
- Event importance measures, including: Fussell-Vesely; Birnbaum; risk
increase ratio and interval; risk reduction ratio and interval; group; and
uncertainty importance.
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Since many probabilistic reliability evaluations include an assessment of
uncertainty, SAPHIRE offers Monte Carlo and Latin Hypercube sampling techniques for
uncertainty propagation.
4.5 Summary
PRA is an effective, quantitative decision support tool. In order to minimize failures
and manage their consequences, the designers, operators and managers must understand
the mechanisms behind them. PRA involves the determination of the likelihoods of
events and the evaluation of their consequences. Its results are used to interpret the
various contributors to risk and are compared, ranked and used in design of systems.
Reliability refers to a component's ability to successfully perform a designated mission.
In measuring reliability quantitatively, the probability of the successful achievement of
the intended mission is used by the help of information related to certain conditions, such
as time-to-failure or time-to-repair. Availability can be considered as a combination of a
component's reliability and maintainability [37]. In other words, it is the probability that
a component will be operational to achieve its intended mission. MTTF is a measure of a
system's reliability where MTTR is a measure of its availability. The fault tree approach
is a graphical method that evaluates all the credible ways the top event, the undesirable
event under consideration, can occur.
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5 Case Study
5.1 Introduction
The most challenging and time consuming part of studying whether fuel cells are
reliable enough to be used as back up power sources for nuclear power plants was finding
fuel cell operational data. Not many fuel cell systems of capacity greater than 200 kW are
operational and being tested. For the few that are, their manufacturers did not wish to
share their operational history with our study. Therefore, with the hope of finding
operation data for fuel cell systems in the megawatt range, or systems that were operated
solely for the purpose of providing back up power, a preliminary analysis was first
performed on operation data of 15 model PA25C fuel cells of the DoD PAFC
demonstration. This section consists of an analysis of the data provided by [6]. In the
subsequent Detailed Analysis section (5.4), a theoretical probability distribution is
selected for both failure and repair times, by hypothesizing exponential, Weibull and
normal distributions and finalizing the decision regarding which distribution to use by a
goodness-of-fit test. Following that, using the computer code SAPHIRE, the effect of
changes on the MTTF and MTTR values of the most frequently failing components on
their sub-system reliability and availability are determined.
After spending a significant amount of time searching for accessible fuel cell data
and consulting experts in the industry, it was decided that the DoD 200 kW phosphoric
acid fuel cell demonstration program provided the most detailed operation data. For that
reason the rest of the analysis was carried on based that database.
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5.2 Preliminary Analysis
5.2.1 MTTF and MTTR values as calculated by [6]
Out of the 15 model PC25C fuel cell power plants installed by DoD, five served at
base hospitals, three in central heating plants and two in galleys. The remaining five were
installed at a gymnasium, laundry facility, an armory building, an office building and
barracks. The majority of these power plants provided space heating and domestic hot
water in addition to generating electricity.
Table 5-1 DoD PAFC model PC25C power plant application sites[6]
Site Name Building Application Thermal Application
Lauglin AFB Base Hospital Space/Reheat/DHW3
Little Rock Base Hospital Space Heat/Reheat
Barksdale AFB Base Hospital Space Heat/Reheat
Groton Central Heating Plant Boiler Make-up Water
US Naval Academy Galley Kitchen DHW
NAS Jacksonville Naval Hospital Space/Reheat/DHW
Ft.Bliss Base Laundry Facility Process Hot Water
911 th Airlift Wing Central Heating Plant Space Heat
Ft.Richardson Armory Building Space Heating/DHW
Fallon NAS Galley DHW
Wetover AFB Central Heating Plant Make-up/Condensate
Davis Monthan Gym DHW/Absorp. Chiller
Edwards AFB Base Hospital DHW/Space heat
Ft.Huachuca Barracks Space Heat/DHW
NDCEE Office Chemical Evaporator
At only two of the sites, namely Ft. Richardson and NAS Fallon, were the fuel cell
power plants used to provide back-up power in case of a grid failure. For the 35,000 hour
test period, according to [2] and [30], the mean time between forced outages (MTTF) of
these 15 plants varied between 110 and 2330 hours, averaging 360 hours. The average
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3 DHW: Domestic Hot Water
availability of the PC25C fleet was 85%; considering a power plant to be unavailable
whenever it was not generating electricity (regardless of the reason).
Mean Time to Failure (hrs)
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Figure 5-1 Actual MTTF values for the 15 PC25C power plants
It should be noted that if redundant units of these power plants were operated in
parallel, i.e. an n-out-of-rn mode where functionality of n units is sufficient for supplying
the safety-critical loads, the availability values of the overall system could be much
higher. The analysis of data, which only represents results for individual power plants,
shows that the majority of the outages observed have taken longer than necessary due to
power plant-independent problems. For safety-related applications, the power sources
would be backed up by physically separated redundant and diverse trains to reduce
vulnerability of the overall system against common cause failure events, such as
construction or fire in a certain area.
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Figure 5-1 shows that the actual MTTF values for the fleet of 15 PC25C's vary
from 1000 hours to about 2500 hours. This difference between power plant failure
frequencies can be explained as being due to several reasons, which are mostly power
plant independent. Similarly, Figure 5-2 shows the MTTR of the PC25C fleet. Analysis
of the data, as the next section covers in detail, shows that one power plant had a 350-
hour outage because it was waiting for replacement parts to ship, and a 240-hour outage
for annual maintenance, because the site didn't have the qualified personnel. Better
equipped sites had maintenance completed in less than 24 hours, and at some of the sites
parts were replaced while the fuel cell system was online. The feedback from [34]
confirms that with the current PureCellTM plants (formerly PC25C) many repair
operations can be completed while the plant is online. The subsequent analysis reflects
these more optimistic conditions.
5.3 Observed Sub-System Failures
The PC25C sub-systems are shown on Figure 5-17. A glance at the data provided
by [30] shows that the majority of failures were observed within the "Other " sub-system.
The 'Other' sub-system includes the "electrical", "gas" and "water" subsystem
components such as the inverter, boost regulator and the circuit breaker that were not
listed under the main sub-systems by [6] nomenclature. Some parts, although classified as
'other electrical' and not identified individually, contributed the most to power plant
unavailability.
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Table 5-2 Number of failures for each PC25C subsystem
System Code # offailures %
Other OTR 159 49.7
Thermal Management System TMS 76 23.8
Air Processing System APS 33 10.3
Water Treatment System WTS 26 8.1
Cabinet Ventilation System CVS 10 3.1
Fuel Processing System FPS 8 2.5
Electrical System ES 4 1.25
Power Section System PSS 2 0.6
Nitrogen Purge System NPS 2 0.6
By looking at the data provided by [30], it is seen that almost all power plants
operated near full power. As [31] and [39] suggest, cell stack voltage degradation is
proportional to power level, implying that if fuel cells on nuclear plant sites were kept
running at low power until demand, their operational lifetimes can be expected to be
longer than if kept shutdown on stand-by.
Figure 5-2 Actual MTTR values for 15 PC25C power plants
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While repair times of 100 hours might be acceptable for many non-safety related
applications, the average time to repair for EDGs at nuclear plants is between 6 and 18
hours [40], and unless backed up by redundant trains, an outage of 19 hours until repair is
unacceptable given the criticality of the core cooling function which the EDGs support.
As mentioned earlier, the long repair periods experienced by the PC25C fleet are due to
lack of well trained and equipped personnel at the PAFC demonstration sites. The
magnitude of repair times depends upon the severity of failures and the availability of
resources and parts. At nuclear plants, besides having redundancy and diversity within
the trains of an emergency core cooling systems, the personnel are highly qualified. Most
power plants do not have dedicated EDG crews on site and if a nuclear plant can not
restore an EDG to operability within 72 hours, it must shut down. For these reasons we
argue that MTTR values in the neighborhood of 24 hours are plausible for nuclear power
plant applications.
Figure 5-3 shows that at the end of the 35,000 hour test period when the
operational data were compiled, 47% of the PC25C's had experienced duty factors4 of
90% or greater, 33% had greater than 80% , 13% had at least 70% availability. Only 6%
(one power plant) had less than 50% availability. The stack of that particular power plant
at NDCEE had frozen and was sent back to the factory until it could be restarted; this
downtime was taken into account by [30] while calculating the unadjusted availability
values.
4 DUp time experienced
Up time + down time experienced
It is the result observed, which is usually different from availability. The former is observed
retrospectively, the latter is formulated prospectively. They are related by the relationship, E(duty factor)
A
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Figure 5-3 PC25C Unadjusted observed duty factor values
5.4 Detailed Analysis
5.4.1 Failure
5.4.1.1 Fitting a theoretical distribution to failure data
Two ways for deriving reliability distributions to fit failure data use either
parametric or non-parametric (empirical) methods. In general, parametric methods that
identify a theoretical distribution (i.e. exponential, Weibull, normal, lognormal) and its
related parameters are preferred over empirical methods for several reasons. Empirical
methods do not provide information beyond the range of the sample data (in most cases
which is small in sample size) and therefore do not provide information concerning the
underlying failure process. On the other hand, if a theoretical distribution is fitted to a set
of data and a statistical test determines that the observed data come from the specified
distribution, then the analysis of the failure process can be carried on in more detail. As
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an example, if the distribution is known, then the effect of changes on the MTTF can
easily be observed.
There are essentially three steps for the fitting of a theoretical distribution [41]:
= Identifying candidate distributions
- Estimating parameter values (usually mean and variance values)
- Performing a goodness of fit test.
For each PC25C power plant operated, MTTF values were calculated by [6], as
shown on Figure 5-1. It is possible to construct a histogram for these data, for a sample
size of 15 units. Determining the proper number or intervals on a histogram is important
since too many intervals can result in insufficient representation of the data and too few
intervals may not reveal the shape of the distribution properly.
Using Sturges' rule5 we find that four classes are sufficient to represent the
histogram for the failure data of the PC25C's, as shown on Figure 5-4.
8
7
6-
5 -
4-03
3-
2
0
0-625 626-1250 1251-1875 1876-2500
Mean Time to Failure, hr
Figure 5-4 Histogram of failure times for PC25C power plants
5 k = integer(1 + 3.3logl0n) where k is the number of classes and n is the sample size
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As a next step in the analysis, it is helpful to look at the empirical hazard rate
function.
Table 5-3 Descriptive Failure Statistics of PC25C data
(MTTF)avg 1677 hrs
(MTTF)Median 1670 hrs
(MTTF)Std. Dev. 1729 hrs
The descriptive statistics of the sample show that the median value for MTTF is
greater than the sample mean of MTTF, and the sample mean and standard deviation are
close enough to suggest that exponential distribution may be a good candidate. However
as Figure 5-5 shows, the sample data have an increasing hazard rate function, which may
rule out the exponential distribution (as it has a constant failure rate) and suggests
modeling with Weibull or normal distributions.
Figure 5-5 Empirical hazard rate curve for PC25C data
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The next step is that of picking a probability distribution and generating a
probability plot. A proper fit of a linear regression line (least squares) to the selected
distribution to the data would look like a straight line (as a visual test) and will have a
high index of fit.
5.4.1.1.1 Exponential Distribution
The cumulative distribution function for the exponential distribution is given by:
F(t) =1- e-" ' Equation 7
and for the least-squares curve fitting the transformation for F(t), the vertical scale of
the plot can be given by [41]:
A ~ 1 6F(t) -> In A. Equation 8
1I-F(t)
A
while F(t) may be any plotting position, in this study chosen as [41]:
A [i -0.31
F(t,) = ln [ . Equation 9
Figure 5-6 shows the least squares fit obtained for the sample data yielding a
resulting index of fit of R = 0.896. The estimated MTTF for the exponential distribution
is 1560 hours.
6 The symbol A is used to indicate an estimate observed from sample data [41].
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Figure 5-6 Exponential least-squares plot of PC25C failure data
5.4.1.1.2 Weibull Distribution
The Weibull cumulative density is given by:
F(t) = l - e _( 9 ),8
and the transformation for the vertical scale of the plot is [41]:
Ar
F(t) -> In In A
_ F(t)
while F(t) is still defined by Equation 3.
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Equation 10
Equation 11
The Weibull distribution yields a MTTF value of 1842 hours, and has an index of
fit of 0.9876, considerably better than the exponential fit.
Weibull Fit
2 -
1 - R2 =0. 9755
0 -
U-
-2
-3 -+
-4-
6.8 7 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.8 8
In(t) hr
Figure 5-7 Weibull least-squares plot of PC25C failure data
5.4.1.1.3 Normal Distribution
For the Normal distribution:
F(t) = <D =D(z) .Equation 12
It can be linearized in t, using another variable, z:
z= - p . Equation 13
F(t) is still defined by Equation 9, and is used to calculate z-values. Figure 5-8
shows a plot of the z values against time. Although the normal distribution is not a true
reliability distribution since the random variable ranges from minus infinity to plus
infinity, the probability that the variable will take on negative values is negligible, and
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therefore can be used to approximate the failure process. The results of a normal
distribution fit yield MTTF = 1677 with an index of fit of 0.9896.
Normal Fit
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Figure 5-8 Normal distribution least-squares plot of PC25C data
5.4.1.2 Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Now that three different failure distributions are under consideration, a goodness-
of-fit test for each should be done, in order to verify that the data actually fit the selected
distribution. There are two types of goodness-of-fit tests: general and specific. In this
study, a specific test was performed for exponential, Weibull and normal distributions.
All of these tests will compare a null hypothesis (Ho) and an alternative (H1).
Ho The failure times do come from the specified distribution
H1  The failure times did not come from the specified distribution
Each test consists of computing a statistic based upon sample failure times, which
is then compared to a critical value obtained from a table of such values. In this study, all
the tables used are obtained from [41].
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5.4.1.2.1 Bartlett's Test for the Exponential Distribution
The test statistic is [41]:
2r rrl2r[ln((1/r)lt0)- (1 /r)J In t,]
i=1 i=1
1+(r +1)/(6r)
where
ti time of failure of I unit
r : number of failures
In this test, the null hypothesis is accepted if
Zi2a/2,r_1 < B < Z 2
holds.
In the equation above, involving 5a12,r_ and '2rchi-square statistics, a, the
level of significance, was taken to be 0.1 for all specific tests. X2 values were obtained
from Table A.3 of [41.]
Using the MTTF values of the PC25C data (after rank-ordering), taking a = 0.1, r
- 15, it was found that
95,14 = 6.57 < (B = 0.83) < 23.7 = O.5,14 ; does not hold!
Since the above inequality is not correct, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the
alternative hypothesis is accepted: Failure times are not exponential.
7 r: degree(s) of freedom
a : level of significance, chosen to be 0.1 in this study for all cases
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Equation 14
Equation 15
5.4.1.2.2 Mann's Test for the Weibull Distribution
The statistic for this test is [41]:
r-I
k, [ln(ti,, - In t,)/ M,]
M =+l Equation 16
ky [ln(t,,, - In t,)/ M,]
where
ki intK r
2
k2ininQr 2;Mi :Zi.1 - Zi
Zi : In -In 1 - i .
n +0.25_
In this test, the null hypothesis is accepted if M < Ferit. The values for Ferit were
obtained from the F-distribution Table of [41], assuming 2k 2 degrees of freedom for the
numerator and 2ki degrees of freedom for the denominator. Using a = 0.1, ki = k2= 7
and calculating the Zi and Mi values corresponding to the MTTF of each power plant
(after rank-ordering), the value of the test statistic M is calculated as 1.064. From the F-
distribution table, Fcrit,O.1,14,14= 2.3. Therefore, since
M = 1.064 < F.rit,0 0 1 14 4 =2.3.
The criterion is satisfied and the null hypothesis is accepted. The failure times for this
sample do fit a Weibull distribution.
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5.4.1.2.3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Normal Distribution
This test compares the empirical cumulative distribution function with the normal
cumulative function. The test statistic is [41]:
D, =max{D, D2  . Equation 17
D,=max jD
where . Equation 18
D2 =max -D
i:!iP!n n s
In the above equations, n is the sample size, i is the index of the power plant being
considered, where ti is the MTTF failure associated with it. t and s2 refer to sample mean
and sample variance, respectively, and for a normal distribution they are calculated as
follows:
Y (t, -t) 2
t i s2 ,=
I= n Equation 19
In this test, if D, < Derit, then the null hypothesis is accepted. Using a = 0.1,
t = 1677 and s = 434.3 hrs, Dn was found to be equal 0.9994, and from table A.7 of [41],
Dcrit,0 .1 was read to be 0.201. Therefore, since 0.9994 = D15 < 0.201 = Dcrit does not hold,
the null hypothesis is rejected. Given the sample PC25C data, the failure times are not
normal.
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5.4.1.3 Summary: Fitting theoretical distribution to failure data
In an attempt to fit an accurate failure model for the PC25C data, three commonly
used distributions were hypothesized: exponential, Weibull and normal. Although the
mean values and index of fit values for all three were within an acceptable range, a
specialized goodness-of-fit test showed that the data do not have exponential or normal
distributions. A compact form of the findings is summarized in Table 5- 4. The reliability
function for the PC25C power plant is shown on Figure 5-9.
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Figure 5-9 Variation of the reliability function of the PC25C power plants with 'theta', useful life
If we accept this distribution, the first curve on the left hand side shows the actual
reliability function for the PC25C power plant, with the shape parameter P = 4.24 and
useful life 0 = 1842, yielding a MTTF = 1678 hours. It is seen from this curve that
currently the PC25C power plants can be expected to have 95% or greater reliability for
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less than 1000 operating hours. Clearly, this does not meet the requirements that a safety-
critical power source would have. Figure 5-9 also shows that as the component useful life
increases (curves shift towards the right), only after the useful life reaches about 5000
hours (MTTF = 4550 hours), the reliability of the power plant can be maintained at 95%
or higher for at least 2000 hours. Consequently, if the useful life reaches 10,000 hours
(MTTF = 9100 hrs), then the reliability of the system can be maintained well above 95%
for at least 5000 hours.
beta =0.5 -+<--beta= 1 -beta =2 + beta = 3 -beta =4.24
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Figure 5-10 Variation of PC25C reliability with shape parameter, p, with 0 fixed at 1823.4
Figure 5-10 shows the variation of PC25C reliability with respect to changes in P,
the shape parameter. This parameter provides information regarding the behavior of the
failure process. A concave curve implies an increase in the hazard rate at a decreasing
rate and a convex curve implies an increasing hazard rate at an increasing rate.
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Table 5-4 Summary of theoretical distribution fitting to failure data
Hypothesized Distribution Index of Fit Goodness-of-fit test
Distribution Parameters passed?
Exponential MTTF - a = 1560 0.89600 no
k= 0.000641
Weibull $= 4.24 0.98767 yes
0 =1842
MTTF = 1678
Normal MTTF = p = 1677 0.98896 no
aT = 469.3
Figure 5-11 shows that if the useful life of the system is 3000 hours (a reasonable
value for today), while p = 4.24 (actual value for PC25Cs today), 95% reliability can be
achieved for 2000 hours, whereas it can only be realized for just under 1000 hours with
the 0 value of 1823.4.
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5.4.2 Repair
When a component (or system) fails, the repair process begins. This process
includes some delay time that may arise due to the wait until a successful diagnosis is
completed obtaining the necessary parts, administrative procedures are completed or
simply due to the time needed for completion of the repair. The majority of the
downtimes in the 15 PC25C fleet were due to delays in shipment of parts, and getting
qualified personnel on site to start the repair process. There are two general types of
maintenance: reactive (i.e. corrective) and proactive (i.e. preventative). Reactive
maintenance refers to handling an unscheduled (or unplanned) performance outage the
unit might experience, and proactive maintenance implies a scheduled downtime, either
for periodically performed preventative maintenance or predictive maintenance (i.e.
symptom-based) that is meant to eliminate some of the unscheduled downtimes.
Similar to the failure case, in order to quantify maintainability, the repair-time
distribution of a system must be defined. In this subsection, exponential, Weibull and
normal distributions are hypothesized for the repair-time distribution of the PC25C fleet,
followed by a goodness-of-fit test for each. The procedures are the same as in section
5.4.1.
5.4.2.1 Fitting a theoretical distribution to repair data
Using the data of Figure 5-2, a histogram of repair times of the PC25C fleet can
be prepared. Since the sample size is 15, the number of classes include in the histogram is
still 4 according to Sturges' rule. Looking at the statistics on Table 5-5, it is seen that
MTTRavg > MTTRmedian and that implies that the data are skewed to the right.
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Figure 5-12 Histogram of repair times for PC25C power plants
In this case the magnitude of the average MTTR value and the standard deviation
are far enough from each other that a comparison will not yield a preliminary estimate for
the candidate distribution.
Table 5-5 Descriptive Repair-time Statistics of PC25C data
(MTTR)avg 358 hrs
(MTTR)Median 192 hrs
(MTTR)Std. Dev. 558 hrs
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5.4.2.1.1 Exponential Distribution
In this section, an analysis very similar to that outlined in section 5.4.1.1.1 is
carried out; therefore the steps and formulas will not be repeated. If an exponential
distribution is assumed, the MTTR value is found to be 592 hours with an index-of-fit of
0.97. This indicates that the repair rate is more likely to be constant when compared to
the failure rate, since the index-of-fit indicates a strong linear fit to the data.
Exponential Fit
R2 = 0.9411
4 5 6 7
In(t) hr
Figure 5-13 Exponential least-squares plot for PC25C repair data
5.4.2.1.2 Weibull Distribution
Similar to the procedure demonstrated in section 5.4.1.1.2, if a Weibull
distribution is fit to the repair data, the MTTR is found as 324 hours with an index-of-fit
of 0.839, not indicating a strong linear correlation.
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Figure 5-14 Weibull least-squares plot of PC25C repair data
5.4.2.1.3 Normal Distribution
Repeating the analysis of section 5.4.1.1.3, it is found that a normal distribution fit
to the PC25C repair data would yield a MTTR value of 358 hours and a weak index-of-fit
of 0.65.
5.4.2.2 Revisiting the repair-time histogram
A second look at Figure 5-2, along with the results from sections 5.4.2.1.1-
5.4.2.1.4 suggests that excluding the repair time of the power plant at NDCEE might
better reveal the repair-time distribution. That power plant was shut down and sent to the
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Figure 5-15 Normal distribution least-squares plot for PC25C data
factory for repair because it had frozen. Since the offsetting MTTR value associated with
this unit makes it harder to fit a distribution, the MTTR values of the power plants were
considered a second time, without the NDCEE MTTR value. Results are summarized in
Figures 5-13 to Figure 5-15.
Exponential Fit Revisited
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Figure 5-16 Exponential distribution least-squares plot modified to exclude NDCEE data
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Weibull Fit Revisited
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Figure 5-17 Weibull distribution least-squares plot modified to exclude NDCEE data
Figure 5-18 Normal distribution least-squares plot modified to exclude NDCEE data
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Figure 5-19 Updated histogram of the PC25C repair time data, excluding the NDCEE plant
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5.4.2.3 Goodness-of-fit Tests
Under the same two hypotheses, HO and H1, as mentioned in section 5.4.1.2, the
modified results obtained by excluding the NDCEE power plant are analyzed to verify
that the hypothesized distributions fit the data.
5.4.2.3.1 Bartlett's Test for the Exponential Distribution
Applying the same test statistic as in section 5.4.1.2.1 to a modified sample size of
14 power plants and the same a (0.1), it was found that:
X0.95,13 = 5.89 < B = 3.0194 < 22.4 = X ; does not hold!
According to this result, the null hypothesis is rejected and it is seen that the
repair-time distribution is not exponential.
5.4.2.3.2 Mann's Test for the Weibull Distribution
Using equation 16 with the modified values of n = r = 14, it is seen that M = 1.241
> Feit = 2.52 does not hold; therefore the null hypothesis is accepted; the repair time
distribution can be represented with the Weibull model.
5.4.2.3.3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Normal Distribution
Using equations 17 and 18 with a sample size of 14 units, D 14 = 0.9994 < 0.207
Derit does not hold, therefore the null hypothesis is rejected and the repair times cannot be
approximated with the normal distribution.
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5.4.2.4 Summary: Fitting theoretical distribution to repair times data
Similar to the failure case estimation, in this section it was determined that if the
calculated MTTR values of the PC25C power plants were treated as a part of a test which
was terminated once all plants failed, and repaired following their failure, the Weibull
model fits the data best. In order to find the function H(t) that represents the probability
that the repair of a part will be completed before time "t" is found by integrating the
probability density function of the Weibull distribution:
f(t) = e (t)Y t ' Equation 20
and
Pr(T t) = H(t) = Jf(t')dt'
0
and from Equation 2 1, the MTTR is calculated as:
MT TR = ft -f(t)dt
Equation 21
Equation 22
Table 5-6 Summary of theoretical distribution fitting to repair time data
Hypothesized Distribution Index of Fit Goodness-of-fit test
Distribution Parameters passed?
Exponential MTTR = a = 204.5 0.9407 no
X =0.004878
Weibull = 2.098 0.9441 yes
0 = 246.8
MTTR =224.7
Normal MTTR = = 237.0 0.8919 no
a = 162
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Figure 5-20 Probability that a repair will be accomplished within time t, while p = 2.098 and 0 = 246.8
Figure 5-20 shows the repair function of the PC25C. It is seen that there is less
than a 0.2 probability that the repair time for a given unit will take less than 100 hours.
Figures 5-21 through 5-26 show the variation of the repair time function with respect to
the parameters P and 0. For the same 0 value, decreasing the P yields a greater
probability of repair under a certain period of time. Similarly, for the same P value, a
lower 0 yields a much higher probability of repair under a certain time limit.
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Figure 5-23 Repair time function, P = 4, 0 = 24
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Availability
Due to relatively inaccurate documentation of forced outages, it is hard to
determine some of the parameters needed for availability calculations. Although some
maintenance hours are provided, the durations of some are combined with other outages
due to different causes (i.e. site-related problems), making it hard to estimate the 'mean
time between maintenance' or ready time. In an effort to simplify this analysis and still
maintain accuracy, a constant failure rate, k, and a constant repair rate, r, are assumed to
obtain, fitting an exponential distribution to availability. Following this, the point
availability of the PC25C systems as a function of time is found by Equation 20:
r +
A(t) = Prob.Success(t) P(t) + exp(-(%+ r)t) . Equation 23
A+r A+r
In this equation the failure rate is used as the reciprocal of the MTTF value
obtained in section 5.4.2, and similarly the repair rate is used as the reciprocal of the
MTTR value calculated in section 5.4.3, both estimated from a Weibull distribution.
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5.4.3 Most Common Causes of Forced Outages for the PC25C fleet
As statistics on Table 5-2 show, failures of three sub-systems constitute almost
85% of the total failures observed among the 15 power plants during 35,000 operating
hours. These are the 'other', 'thermal management' and 'air processing' subsystems.
When investigated further, the components within these subsystems can be ranked
according to their failure frequencies.
Figure 5-28 PC25C Sub-Systems
The purpose of the analysis that is carried out in this section is to observe the
effects of changes of component MTTF values upon the sub-system MTTF and
availability values, assuming a fixed MTTR value of 24 hours. It was mentioned
previously that at nuclear plants, almost all EDG repair events are handled successfully
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within 6 to 18 hours, despite the fact that the actual PC25C fleet experienced MTTR
values on the order of hundreds of hours. In the computer code SAPHIRE, the MTTF and
MTTR values obtained following the distribution-fit analysis of the previous chapters are
used as base values.
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Figure 5-29 Prospective number of failures of the components of the 'thermal management'
subsystem; total failures observed: 76
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Figure 5-31 Prospective number of failures of the components of the 'other electrical' subsystem,
total number of failures observed: 159
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Figure 5-30 Prospective number of failures of the components of the 'air processing' subsystem,
total number of failures observed: 33
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As Figures 5-29 through 5-31 show, in each of the most frequently failing subsystems,
some components contribute to system failure several times more often than others. In the
'other electrical' subsystem, the inverter, bridge, controller and grid connections seem to
be the dominant components. The failure probability of the 'other electrical' subsystem is
calculated by SAPHIRE as 0.07786 assuming each of its components have a 1678 hr
MTTF value, and its unavailability as 2.13x10 2 , again assuming, each component has a
MTTR value of 225 hours. It is reasonable to use these numbers that were obtained from
a Weibull fit initially since each component was assumed to be in series with others. This
means that the failure of a component will lead to sub-system failure.
It is important to note that in this study it has been assumed that the failure of any
one component is independent of the failure of any others. Although this assumption may
be reasonable for many cases, in practice it is observed that a system fails more
frequently than the value predicted under the assumption of independent failures.
Common cause failures are one of the most important modes of failures that have an
effect on overall reliability of the system. While some common cause failures can be
identified and eliminated, some can not be, and those should be accepted and their effects
should be minimized. A simple example can show the effects of common cause failure on
system failure rate and unavailability. For the 'other electrical' system components
shown on Figure 5-30, the MTTF, MTTR and corresponding failure and repair rates are
listed on Table 5-7, showing independent failure frequencies including and excluding
common cause failure frequencies.
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Figure 5-32 Probability of failure variations of three most frequently failing subsystems with
variations in the MTTF values of their most frequently failing component
In order to integrate common cause failure probabilities into the analysis, the D-
factor method can be used. The p-factor method assumes that the component total failure
frequency is the sum of the component's independent failure frequency and the common
cause failure frequency associated with it. It can be defined as [43]:
)6 = & .*AF Equation 24
where kc denotes the common cause failure frequency and kT the component's total
failure frequency which can alternatively be defined as [43]:
Ar I.(1l-,$) Equation 25
where k is the independent failure frequency.
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Table 5-7 Properties of the 'other electrical' subsystem with and without common cause failure
effects, p = 0.1
MTTF A (independent MTTR p (repair rate) A'(independent failureComponent (hr) failurefreq.) fhr) hr- eq. including CCF
hrhr frequency) hr'
Inverter 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
CSA 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
PC Card 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
Fuse 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
Bridge Fault 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
Quad Power 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4Supply
Dual Power 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4Supply
Relay Trip 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
Ground Fault 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
Controller 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
Grid Dist. 1678 5.96E-4 225 4.44E-3 6.62E-4
Taking f 0.1 as a reasonable estimate and using equations 24 and 25 to update
the total failure frequency of each component, the output from SAPHIRE shows that the
probability of failure of the 'other electrical' system becomes 0.0832 (a 7% increase from
0.07786) and the unavailability becomes 0.02822 (a 32% increase from 0.0213) once
common cause failures are considered.
These results show that although common cause failure rates were assumed to be
only 10% of the independent failure rates, their effects on system properties can be
significant and they should be included in the assessment if possible.
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Figure 5-32 was generated with the output from the SAPHIRE program. As the
base case, it uses the calculated MTTF = 1678 hours and MTTR = 225 hours for each
component in all three most frequently failing sub-systems: thermal management, air
processing and other electrical. Once the base case was determined, then the most
frequently failing two components were identified and their MTTF values were varied
from 1678 hours to 10000 hours, while the rest of the components' MTTF values were
kept at the base case value. While an improvement in the MTTF value of component
TE431 (thermal management temperature control) decreased the thermal management
subsystem's failure rate almost by half, for the other two subsystems this change was not
very significant. Even when the inverter component had a 10000-hr MTTF value, the
failure rate of the "other electrical" subsystem wasn't improved by much, underlining
that it is system architecture that leads to a highly reliable system as opposed to the
performance of individual components.
Figure 5-33 Fault tree for the failure of the air processing system to supply air the required pressure
107
5.5 Summary
In this section, the real life failure and repair data of the PC25C fleet was studied.
First the MTTF and MTTR of each power plant in the fleet were found. Then, although
this was an average number calculated from data of the operation of the power plants for
35,000 hours, this result was treated as the time-to-failure of a PC25C plant as if it were
operated under a test, in a fleet of 15 plants, and the test would be terminated when the
15th failure occurred. Following this step, the failure and repair times of PC25C power
plants were rank-ordered and then three different probability distributions were tested for
fit. For both failure and repair times, specific goodness-of-fit tests showed that the data
followed a Weibull distribution. Once the distribution type was determined, the reliability
function of a PC25C power plant, its sensitivity to distribution parameters and the
probability function regarding repair times were calculated.
Once the failure and repair-time mechanisms were identified, a point estimate of the
availability of the PC25C power plant was calculated. Following this step, the most
frequently failing subsystems of the power plant were identified, and the MTTF and
MTTR values of their components were varied. Discussion of all results is presented in
Chapter 6.
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6 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
The main objective of conducting the study reported here was to determine whether
fuel cell systems could provide high reliability back-up power to the Gas Cooled Fast
Reactor, one of the designs being considered along with five other Generation IV nuclear
power reactors. Because of its gas coolant and relatively high power density, the
resulting need for an ultra-high shutdown cooling system reliability requirement make the
GFR a good candidate for fuel cell applications on nuclear plant sites in the future. In
order to determine whether fuel cell systems would be fit for such a task by 2030, when
Gen IV reactors might be deployed in the US, it was necessary to examine the available
information today. For this task fuel cells were identified as an ideal candidate because
their operational principle eliminated a "failure to start" mode. The likelihood that Gen
IV reactors will be producing hydrogen onsite together with electricity was also a
motivating factor.
This study analyzes real life operation data of 15 model PC25C phosphoric acid fuel
cells obtained from the DoD Phosphoric Acid Demonstration Program. Along with
earlier models, a fleet of 30 fuel cells were installed at DoD bases starting in the year
1994. The data that constitute the base for this study come from 35,000 hours of
operation between the years 1997 and 2001.
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6.1 Conclusions and Discussion of Results
6.1.1 Reliability
Among two other possible distributions, a Weibull distribution was fit to the
PC25C fleet failure data with parameters P = 4.24 and 0 = 1842, yielding a MTTF value
of 1678 hours. Figure 6-1 shows the reliability function plotted against time. In this plot,
time (hr) 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Figure 6-1 Variation of PC25C reliability with shape parameter, p, with 0 fixed at 1823.4
the effect of changes of 0, useful life, is observed. MTTF is directly related to 0. It is seen
that as the MTTF value of a system increases (as its useful life increases), the period of
operating time that it can be highly reliable also increases. For the PC25C system, with
the MTTF value obtained from the analysis in section 5.4.1, 95% reliability can be
realized for about 1000 hours of operation. Reliability falls down to about 50% just under
2000 hours, and to zero around 3000 hrs.
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The figure also shows that if 95% or higher reliability is expected for 2500 hours,
then the 0 value of the system needs to be improved to 5000 hours. As [30] notes, there
have been PC25C units that operated for 40,000 hours without failure. Although 10,000
hours of useful life is a realistic goal for fuel cell stacks even today, due to their overall
system design (and not just phosphoric acid types), the unreliability of their support
systems bring their time-to-failure down.
Since this 10,000 hour goal can be accomplished today (with some units at 40,000
hours) , it can be concluded that together with improvements in support systems, their
compatibility and performance, fuel cell systems of MW scale size will be able to provide
highly reliable back-up power at nuclear plant sites.
The GFR shutdown cooling system will require highly reliable power on the order
of only a few hundred kWs - making it an ideal application for fuel cells. It should be
kept in mind that by having redundant and diverse components (using a combination of
fuel cells, diesel generators, microturbines, batteries...) an extremely reliable system can
be built, compensating for the low but inherent unreliability of individual components.
The PC25C power plant was also studied on a sub-system level. It was
determined that 3 out of 9 subsystems contributed to almost 85% of all failures observed
among 15 power plants whose data was recorded for 35,000 hours of operation. These
sub-systems were the 'other electrical', 'thermal management' and 'air processing' sub-
systems. Within these, the most frequently failing components were identified.
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As expected, these are support systems that either help convert DC electricity into
AC or components that maintain proper operation conditions for the cell stack. Failures
related to the cell stack constituted less than 2% of the total failures experienced by the
fleet.
Using the software SAPHIRE, fault trees representing the ways these three sub-
systems could fail were drawn (Figure 5-33 shows the fault tree for the Air Processing
Subsystem). Since actual sub-system diagrams showing the configuration of the
components were not provided by the manufacturer, all fault trees were drawn under the
assumption that the failure of any component would lead to system failure. This
assumption added extra conservatism to the results since in real life systems, some
components may be operated in parallel as opposed to series and in most cases repair of a
certain component is possible without bringing the entire plant offline.
The results of this analysis by SAPHIRE showed that a two-fold or even a four-
fold increase in a component's reliability affects the overall subsystem reliability very
little.
6.1.2 k-out-of-n Redundancy
Table 6-1 shows the effect of operating n components in parallel when k of them
are expected to function fully for system success. Components are assumed to be
independent with reliability 0.95.
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Table 6-1 System reliability variation with redundancy
System Reliability
No redundancy 0.95
1-out-of-2 0.9975
1-out-of-3 0.999875
1 -out-of-4 0.999994
2-out-of-3 0.99275
2-out-of-4 0.999519
3-out-of-4 0.985981
It is shown in Table 5.1 of [42] that the system failure probability investigated for
auxiliary cooling loop options in which common cause failures are also conservatively
considered, goes down by a factor 10 when 2 x 100%, 3x100%, 3x50%, 5x50% or
4x33% capable loops are considered, as opposed to the case with a x100o% capable loop
only.
It should be noted that one major advantage of fuel cell systems is that individual
cells can be made redundant within the cell stack itself, automatically switching to a
functional cell from a failed one by the help of a computer. The integration of this feature
into all commercially available fuel cell systems by 2030 would significantly increase
individual fuel cell power plant reliability.
6.1.3 Common Cause Failures
In this study, all failures were assumed to be independent and common cause
failures were not factored into the analysis. However, a simple calculation applied to the
'other electrical' sub-system showed that (section 5.4.3) by taking the common cause
failure rate to be 10% of the independent failure rate of a component (P = 0.1), the
subsystem failure probability went up 7% and unavailability went up 32%. These results
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yielded by the p-factor method show that reliability and availability properties of a
component (or system) can be predicted more accurately if common cause failures are
considered.
6.1.4 Repair time
By using actual PC25C fleet MTTR values, a theoretical probability distribution
was selected among 3 candidate distributions; exponential, Weibull and normal. A
goodness-of-fit test determined that as in the failure case, a Weibull distribution was the
best match. It should be noted that the unusually long repair time associated with the
power plant at NDCEE that froze was excluded from the analysis. Once the distribution
was determined, its density function was integrated to obtain information about repair
times of PC25C power plants. Figure 5-20 shows that with B = 2.098 and 0 = 246.8
values for the actual case (yielding a MTTR = 245 hrs), the probability that a repair will
be completed under 100 hours is less than 0.2 whereas the repair times for EDGs at
nuclear plants is between 6-18 hours. Figure 5-24 gives a probability of 0.5 that repairs
will be completed under 6 hours and almost 1.0 that the repairs will be completed less
than 18 hours.
It should be noted that the average MTTR of the PC25C fleet was about 120
hours, mostly due to the lack of immediate attention and lack of qualified personnel on-
site. The experience and expertise of the personnel that maintain EDGs on nuclear power
plant sites can be expected to apply to fuel cell systems if they were to be used for
emergency back-up power sources.
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With increasing experience and knowledge regarding fuel cell operations, and
better trained personnel, the repair times if the PC25C fleet (1992 technology) could have
been much lower, and consequently it is expected to become lower in time.
6.1.5 Availability
The average availability of the PC25C fleet for the 35,000 hour operation period
was determined by [6] to be 85%. This number only represents the period between
September 1997 and August 2001 for which the data was recorded. Reports written by
[6], [31] on the operation period proceding indicate availability values greater than 95%.
In this study, in order to calculate the point availability both failure rate and repair
rates were assumed to be constant; yielding an exponential distribution. Figure 5-27
shows the availability function with the MTTF and MTTR values that were obtained by
using the Weibull distribution. It is seen that for the current fleet, the probability that the
PC25C system will be operating at between 500 and 3000 hours is almost 89%; not good
enough for ultra-high reliability needs. From this figure it can also be seen that the
availability of the PC25C system is around 75% for less than 100 operating hours.
Since availability is a function of reliability and repair, the prediction of higher
reliability and improved MTTR values for fuel cell power plants yields the result that
they will also have sufficiently high availability values by 2030.
Table 6-2 Summary of current PC25C properties and goals for 2030
PC25C Property Current Goals
Reliability 95% up to 1000 hrs >95% up to at least 5000 hrs
Repair time >100 hrs between 6 and 18 hrs
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Availability 75-89% >95%
6.1.6 Fuel Cell Power Plant and EDG Support Systems
The results of the DoD PAFC Demonstration Program and the analysis carried out
in this study show that the support systems to the fuel cell stack contribute the most to
system unreliability and unavailability. As [27] and [40] indicate, similar problems apply
for EDG support systems. The most commonly failing components for fuel cell systems
for the PC25C fleet were the inverters, bridges, controllers and relays[6], whereas for
EDGs they were [40] voltage regulators, governors, relays, switches and contacts.
As most of the electrical system components are in common with fuel cells and
EDGs, an improvement in reliability and availability for both fuel cell and EDG support
systems can be expected by 2030. This implies that fuel cells and EDGs, and possibly
microturbines, could successfully be combined to devise a redundant, diverse and highly
reliable ECCS for next generation power plants.
6.2 Recommendations for Future Work
This study reflects the results of a year long research related to fuel cell systems, fuel
cell operation data, emergency diesel generators and Gen-IV nuclear reactors. This work
can be continued by obtaining and analyzing the most current 35,000-50,000 hours of
operating data of the PC25C fleet. With the support of manufacturers, if the operation
data of different fuel cell types, over a range of sizes, can be analyzed, the results will
provide more accurate answers to identifying the most important factors for the
applications of fuel cells on nuclear power plants. Particular attention should be paid to
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the ongoing work to develop fuel cell systems for data processing centers and for
automobile propulsion.
The scope of this study did not cover certain aspects regarding the economics, sizing,
electrical fitting, emission or noise levels of fuel cells. Given the fact that the majority of
the current nuclear plants have their EDGs licensed, in order for fuel cells to be
considered now or in the future, they should have other attractive properties besides their
high reliability. The current capital costs of fuel cells (offset by their low operation and
maintenance costs in addition to the energy savings they bring,) stand as the biggest
obstacle preventing their faster commercialization.
Finally, it would be ideal if one or more fuel cell systems in the MW power capacity
range, designed explicitly for nuclear plant service, were installed and operated grid
independently, solely for emergency back up power generation and run at low power
when there was no demand. It is also recommended that other types of fuel cells such as
MCFCs, SPFCs and especially PEMFCs be monitored and considered for back-up power
applications at nuclear plants. This way, stack related or stack independent failure modes
could be identified and the response to transients, load following and voltage degradation
characteristics could be better understood. This would yield the most accurate insights to
system level reliability and availability.
Within the 25 year period between now and 2030, it can be stated with certainty
that fuel cell systems will take their place among the top choices for emergency power
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generation. For current LWRs, there are at present no commercially available fuel cell
systems that could handle emergency back up power generation; however they could
succefully replace the DC batteries that are used to extend the coping time in case of a
station blackout event. For the GFR shutdown cooling system, postulated to become
operational in 25 years, they can be projected to constitute an excellent fit given the
required size range, and improvements that are predicted to happen together with much
lower costs.
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7 Appendix A
This appendix contains two tables that show emergency diesel generator load demands in
a typical nuclear power plant, for steady state conditions, with or without a safety
injection signal.
122
7.1 Load Sequencing of EDGs without a safety injection signal
[26]
Transfer to Startup Transformer
Auto Transfer to Startup
Transformer
Start Delay (Seconds)
w/o SIS After Power is Restored (3)
Time
System
Requirements
Bus F Bus G Bus H
480V Load Center 0 0
Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps
480V Containment
Fan Coolers (1)
480V Containment
Fan Coolers (1)
10
+1
-1
25
+2
-1.5
25
+2
-1.5
10
+1
-1
25
+2
-1.5
25
+2
-1.5
25
+2
-2
48 seconds after
transfer, Note (2)
(DCM S-17B)
Note 4
(DCM S-23A)
Note 4
(DCM S-23A)
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For
Flow
0
NOTES:
(1) Containment Fan Cooler Units auto start in Low speed.
(2) Under non-accident conditions, the start times for the ASW and CCW
pumps are not critical. However, the CCW overheating analysis takes credit for the
automatic start of the ASW pumps during an accident with the single failure of an SSPS
train. The ASW is credited to start within the above time limits (48 secs with offsite
power, 58 secs without offsite power) using the Auto-Transfer timers. (AR A0152981)
(3) Auto Transfer to the Startup Transformer does not trip the 4kV loads.
4kV motors that are running (normally 1 -ASW and 2-CCWs, and possibly 1 -CCP) will
restart when their bus is re-energized.
CFCU are not required to support safe shutdown of the plant in the event of
Appendix R fire or Station Blackout. However, a minimum of 3 CFCUs are normally in
operation (AR A0451334 AEl).
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7.2 Load Sequencing of EDGs with a safety injection signal [26]
SIS Transfer to Startup
Transformer or to
Diesel Generators
Start Delay (Seconds)
After Power is Restored (1)
BusF BusG BusH
Time For
System Flow
Requirements
480V Load Center
Centrifugal Charging Pumps
Safety Injection Pumps
Residual Heat Removal
Pumps
480V Containment Fan
Coolers
(Low speed start
100 HP)
480V Containment Fan
Coolers
(Low Speed
100 HP)
2
-0.5
+1
2
-0.5
+1
6
+1
-1
only
6
+1.5
-1
10
+1.5
-1
10
+1
-1
14
+1
start only -1
Component Cooling Water
Pumps
Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps
18
+1.5
-1
22
14
+1
-1
18
+1
-1
22
2
+1
-1
6
+1
-1
10
+1
-1
25 Sec. from
SSPS SI Output
(DCM S-9)
25 Sec. from
SSPS SI Output
(DCM S-9)
25 Sec. from
SSPS SI Output
(DCM S-9)
38/48 Sec. from
SI Sensor Actuation
(PGE-6642,
23A)
DCM S-
38/48 Sec. from
SI Sensor Actuation
(PGE-6642,
23A)
14
+1
-1.5
DCM S-
Note (2)
(Chron 167787,
DCM S-23A)
48/58 Sec. from
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0 0 0
Notes:
Westinghouse Electric Corp. has determined that the starting of a CCW pump:
within 18 seconds after the start of any CCP,
within 18.5 seconds after the start of any SI pump,
within 14.5 seconds after the start of any RHR pump,
will provide adequate cooling for these vital loads. [Chron 167787]. With a containment
high pressure sensor actuation (setpoint is approximately 3 PSIG), starting a CCW pump
within 38 seconds without loss of offsite power (48 seconds with loss of offiste power)
will provide adequate CFCU cooling. [DCM S-23A, Section 4.3.4.2] Starting the CCW
pumps prior to the ASW pumps is acceptable due to the time it takes for heated water to
reach the CCW heat exchangers (approximately 1/2 of the 3 minute loop transport time).
(AR A0449058)
(3) The start of the ASW pumps within the time limits specified above (48
secs. with offsite power, 58 secs. without offsite power) is acceptable because ASW flow
will be available before heated CCW water enters the CCW heat exchangers. (AR
A0449058) The CCW overheating analysis takes credit for the automatic start of the
ASW pumps during an accident with the single failure of an SSPS train. The ASW is
credited to start within the above time limits (48 secs with offsite power, 58 secs without
offsite power) using the Auto-Transfer timers.
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8 Appendix B
This appendix contains the failure frequencies of the components of the PC25C
power plant, ranked in descending order.
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Component Code Sub-system # offailures %
OTHER ELECTRICAL OTRE OTR 109 29.3
BRIDGE FAULT BRDG OTR 26 6.99
INVERTER INV OTR 21 5.65
ANCILLARY COOLANT SUB-SYSTEM ACS TMS 18 4.84
CONTROLLER CRL OTR 17 4.57
CELL STACK COOLING H20 SUB- CSCW TMS 16 4.3
SYSTEM
THERMAL TEMP MANAGEMENT TE431 TMS 15 4.03
CONTROL
AIR FLOW TRANSMITTER FT140 APS 10 2.69
CABINET VENTILATION SYSTEM CVS CVS 10 2.69
CATHODE AIR VALVE FCV110 APS 9 2.42
WATER TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT450 WTS 9 2.42
FUEL PROCESSING SYSTEM FPS FPS 8 2.15
OTHER GAS OTRG OTR 8 2.15
FLOW SWITCH FS400 TMS 7 1.88
THERMAL TEMP MANAGEMENT TE400 TMS 6 1.61
CONTROL
MOTORIZED VALVE TCV400 TMS 6 1.61
RELAY TRIP RELAY OTR 6 1.61
VENTILATION FAN FAN150 CVS 5 1.34
QUAD POWER SUPPLY QUAD OTR 5 1.34
DUAL POWER SUPPLY DUAL OTR 5 1.34
FLOW CONTROL VALVE FCV012 FPS 4 1.08
MOTORIZED VALVE TCV830 TMS 4 1.08
FUSE FUSE OTR 4 1.08
GRID DISTIRBANCE GRID OTR 4 1.08
VALVE POSITION INDICATIOR ZT1 10 APS 3 0.81
COOLANT PUMP PMP400 TMS 3 0.81
POWER CONDITIONING SYSTEM PCS ES 3 0.81
GROUND FAULT GRND OTR 3 0.81
PROCESS AIR BLOWER BLO100 APS 2 0.54
REFORMER BURNER FCV140 APS 2 0.54
FLOW ORIFICE F0400 TMS 2 0.54
PUMP PMP830 TMS 2 0.54
FEEDWATER PUMP PMP451 WTS 2 0.54
MOTORIZED AC CURCUIT BREAKER MCBOO1 ES 2 0.54
POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PDS ES 2 0.54
UNINTERUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY UPS001 ES 2 0.54
CSA CSA OTR 2 0.54
OTHER WATER OTRW OTR 2 0.54
EJECTOR EJTO10 FPS 1 0.27
INTEGRATED LOW TEMP SYSTEM ILS FPS 1 0.27
THERMAL CONTROL HEAT HEX400 TMS 1 0.27
EXCHANGER
BLOWDOWN COOLER HEX431 TMS 1 0.27
WTS PUMP PMP450 WTS 1 0.27
VENTILATION FAN FAN165 CVS 1 0.27
FLOW SWITCH FS165 CVS 1 0.27
PC CARD PC OTR 1 0.27
Figure 8-1 Failure frequencies of the PC25C power plant
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